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IN every belligerent country the Socialists are gaining tremendously in power, and they are infinitely stronger to-day than in August, 1914. They are waging a campaign for peace by negotiation." So says the usually well informed London correspondent of the New York Tribune. The statement would not be true of the United States, in which alone the Socialist party has condemned the participation of its own country in the war as part of an iniquitous capitalist class conspiracy. The official American Socialist organization has degenerated into a sect of hyphenates, and is henceforth hopelessly divided from the radical and working-class movement in this country. But unless all signs fail the contrary is true of Europe. The general popular desire for some relief from the sufferings caused by the war, the general desire on the part of the radical parties of all nations to tackle their formidable domestic problems before they become excessively difficult and acute is creating a political condition which is profoundly modifying the disposition of all the governments of Europe. The heads of the governments may them-

selves be ready to take the chance of fighting on for another year, but they have to recognize the force of the growing demand for peace, and they are afraid to allow the Socialists to reap the benefit of being the only political organization which is seeking to satisfy that demand. This is the meaning of the political ferment which has been caused by the question of sending French and English delegates to the Stockholm conference. It is the reflection of a situation whose effects will become increasingly important during the autumn months, and which may result in the beginning of serious peace negotiations before Christmas.

THE Senate war revenue bill, as reported from committee, is probably about as progressive a taxation measure as can be passed at the present time. The bulk of the two billions it is expected to raise will come from incomes and war profits. The indirect taxes included in the bill are satisfactory, with the exception of the excises on coffee, tea, cocoa and sugar, which are to yield \$86,000,000 and will pretty certainly add more than that amount to the cost of living of our poorer citizens, already seriously enough distressed to make head against prices of necessities one hundred per cent in advance of those of pre-war times. The bill sins chiefly in the way of moderation. It would have been quite possible to raise the rates of income taxation very considerably, and war profits, if subjected to a scheme of graduation that would make the higher percentages pay taxes corresponding to those of Great Britain, could have been made to yield several hundred millions more. Tobacco could have been taxed an additional fifty millions. But we should perhaps be content with what is relatively a courageous departure from our early tradition of financing wars almost exclusively through borrowings. We have in the present measure a fairly sound foundation upon which succeeding Congresses may, if our legislators receive a sufficient education in economics, build up a really adequate system of taxation.

THE new Russian cabinet looks promising. It embodies a combination of all the progressive parties who resist reaction and support the Revolution, and are opposed to a separate peace. Its composition, consequently, is similar to that of the first revolutionary cabinet; but the control and the emphasis are different. The control seems to rest with the group of opportunist Socialists for whom socialism is not incompatible with the attempt to organize an authoritative national government. Too much must not be expected of them. They will be preoccupied chiefly with the internal conditions of the country and their absorbing problem will be to save Russia from sheer disintegration. They can hardly be expected to reorganize the Russian army and to enable it again to fight. But they may be able to regain for the government some measure of authority. In any event, the Russian leaders are showing, in the midst of the gravest possible crisis in the affairs of the country, a sound political instinct. They are pulling together under the leadership of Kerensky, and are consequently doing much to mitigate the dangers inseparable from a thoroughgoing dictatorship. The Russian democracy has no constitution, but it is conforming to the method of constitutional government.

MR. C. W. GILBERT, Washington correspondent of the New York Tribune, does The New Republic the honor of calling it one of the most influential advocates of a new definition of peace terms by the United States on the basis of no annexations and no indemnities, the purpose being to secure an early peace by strengthening the hand of the radical party in Germany. Since this is an easy misinterpretation of our position, we take the liberty of correcting Mr. Gilbert, begging the indulgence of those readers who on account of many repetitions already understand what our objects really are. Our primary purpose is not to secure an early peace, but to lay the foundations of a permanent one. To this end the democratization of Germany is necessary, as all admit. But the democratization of Germany will not take place so long as its government can make the people think they are fighting in self-defense. And the German people will continue to think so until the Allies issue a liberal definition of their peace terms. The logic is simple, and there is little excuse for distorting it. We advocate, not an immediate renunciation of annexations and indemnities on the part of the Allies, but a clear statement that territorial and other penalties will be renounced provided the proper guaranties of democracy and future peace are secured by the German people. And we insist that "the time is ripe," most de-

cidedly, for such a declaration. Nothing could more endanger the future peace of the world than to leave the German radicals defenseless now, and allow them to be permanently convinced that the Allied governments are imperialist at heart.

ACCORDING to the New York American Mr. Elihu Root is reported to have said recently in an interview given out at Chicago: "Russian women have surely earned a right to a voice in political affairs, and not only have they earned that right but the welfare of the New Russia depends upon their exercising it." Does this statement mean that Mr. Root, like Mr. Asquith, has been converted by the experience of the war to a recognition of the political capabilities of women? Or does Mr. Root believe that as a consequence of willingness of some of them to shoulder guns, all women who are Russians, but no others, have earned the right to a voice in political affairs? The second interpretation can scarcely be correct. Have not American women also indicated a willingness to serve their country and to fight for righteous political causes? They have among other things been fighting for the right to have a voice in political affairs. Their action in fighting for political rights can scarcely disqualify them, as compared with the women of Russia, for the exercise of those rights.

NOW that other obstacles to rapid ship construction have been removed, we may hope that the Emergency Shipbuilding corporation will lose no time in settling the labor troubles that have hampered the industry for weeks. The methods by which the War Department has succeeded in maintaining harmony between the contractors and workmen engaged in cantonment construction would probably prove equally effective in the shipyards. Responsible labor leaders may be counted upon to waive all claims that do not bear immediately upon the wage contract, such as the exclusion of non-union men. The government in turn can afford to impose as basal terms such wages and hours as the unions had won where they were successful. Tonnage is at such a premium that labor can be given generous wages in return for its best service. Misunderstandings and disputes will inevitably arise as the work proceeds, but there should be no difficulty in inducing labor to agree to accept as final the decisions of properly constituted arbitration boards.

THE women of New York City may lack the vote, but they do not lack definite ideas about the things which ought to be accomplished by the city during the next four years. And since they believe in the greater force of organized ideas, the

Women's Municipal League has formed a Woman's Committee of One Hundred for Non-Partisan City Government. Their platform is one that might well serve as model for women in any city who are interested in civic betterment. It calls for specific and practical reforms in the fields of public education, health, labor, corrections and charities. If it omits such fundamental issues as municipal ownership of public utilities and taxation reforms, it is because there is already a public demand for them, recognized by the political parties. What the women's platform stresses are the things most likely to be forgotten in the present crisis. Excusing themselves by war-emergencies, the forces of reaction may annul the educational and sanitary reforms which have lately been brought about. To prevent this, and to assure further progress, the Woman's Committee will take active part in the mayoralty campaign in support of the present administration, because its past record is a reasonable guaranty of future social service.

ON July 28th the New Republic published a paragraph which described a bomb-dropping cartoon, and gave extracts, altered so as to read as if they were of German origin, from the text in which the cartoon was explained and enforced. Text and cartoon were in reality an appeal to young Americans to go into aviation and drop bombs all over Germany. They were published in several western newspapers, the particular paper we had before us while writing the paragraph being the Spokane Spokesman-Review for July 1st. In this paper the text was headed "Copyright, 1917, by the Star Company, Great Britain, rights reserved." This led us to infer that the Star Company was a British concern. The inference was incorrect. Cartoon and text had already appeared, on June 10th, as we have since learned, in the New York American, where the text did duty as an editorial. In the American the copyright notice was printed correctly, as follows: "Copyright, 1917, by the Star Company. Great Britain Rights Reserved." Our apologies are due to the non-existent British Star Company. No British company had anything whatever to do with the publication of either text or cartoon. The responsibility for both is entirely the American Star Company's. In other words, it is Mr. Hearst's.

IN commandeering the ships building on foreign account our government is simply taking a necessary step toward the efficient conduct of the war. Construction can be pressed by the government as it could not be pressed by private companies. But it ought to be made clear at once that our action is directed solely by military necessity,

and not with an incidental view to the upbuilding of our merchant marine at the expense of our allies, or even of neutrals. The British and Norwegian and other foreign companies that took the risks involved in ordering ships in our yards at the prevailing high costs have a right to expect from us scrupulous regard for their legitimate interests. Ultimately such ships ought to be made over on fair terms to the companies that ordered them. If those companies would agree to use them in the employment and under the regulations of our allies and ourselves, there is no reason why we should not turn the ships over when completed, upon receipt of a payment equivalent to their cost. It may be necessary to keep the ships until the end of the war. In such case, we should still return them finally upon receipt of a payment equal to cost less the profits they had earned. There is no serious difficulty in devising a formula that will free us from all suspicion of using the world's common need for shipping as a pretext for advancing our particular national interest.

AN English correspondent has criticized severely a suggestion of The New Republic that efforts should be made to supply neutral markets with goods such as were formerly supplied by Germany, thus hastening the decay of the German selling organization in those markets. Such a policy, our correspondent urges, would mean the displacement of British trade by American, since England has not the tonnage nor the surplus industrial power to maintain her former exportation. To push trade at all at such a time as this is to push that of America at the expense of the trade of her Allies. This is, however, quite to mistake our position. As all the world knows, influential classes in Germany are keenly alive to the value of a selling organization established throughout Latin America and the Orient. They count upon it for the rapid recovery of their economic position after the war. Anything that threatens this organization with dissolution is for the Germans an argument for ending the war as soon as possible. If our Allies, by supplying goods where German supplies have failed, can threaten the German agencies with financial extinction, good. If we can perform this service in the common cause, this is equally good. There is not, however, the least reason why we should utilize our superior exporting power to the disadvantage of our allies. We can pool our issues with them and build up their trade along with our own. This is a matter of international etiquette, well worth attention. It is more than a matter of etiquette to arrive at some arrangement by which the German selling organization will be extirpated unless the Germans soon make peace.

Taking Stock

WHATEVER may be the outcome of the attempt to organize an authoritative government in Russia, there can after the events of the last few weeks be little doubt about the part which Russia will hereafter play in the military campaign against Germany. Hereafter the Russian army will scarcely count as an organized force. Because of its collapse the siege of Germany has in a sense been raised. The Germans will probably be able to replenish their food supplies, if not from Russia at least in Russia; and while a large number of German soldiers will still be required for police work on the eastern front, their whole reserve of men, guns and ammunition can to even a greater extent than heretofore be concentrated in the west. This is a new fact of enormous importance in the calculations of the Allied governments; and to none is it of more importance than to the United States. The Western Allies can do nothing to make up for the loss in military power which they have suffered as a consequence of the Russian military collapse. They are already exerting themselves to the utmost. If there is any additional surplus of men and material to be thrown into the balance, it must be derived from the still untouched resources of the American nation.

Since additional exertions are likely to be required of the American people they have a reason all their own to take stock of their existing situation. They need more than ever to consider soberly what political objects they expect to accomplish by fighting Germany, and the kind and amount of military, naval and industrial preparation which are required for a sufficient assurance of success. Neither can this stock-taking be confined to an appraisal of the assets, the liabilities and the purposes of the United States. America's purposes and preparations must be adjusted to those of her Allies. The American nation is engaged in a great coöperative international undertaking, to which it has its own special contribution to make. The nature of this contribution must depend in part upon the needs of its associates and in part upon its own physical environment and moral character. Americans cannot take stock of their own situation without going into an accurate survey of the existing political and physical geography of the whole war. They must consider what the resources and prospects of their allies are after three years of fighting, how much they can add to these resources and what difference their coöperation is likely to make to the result. Those who are interested in such a survey can perhaps obtain some assistance in making it from a letter signed X which is published on another page of this issue. It was written

two months ago by an eminent French publicist to an American friend. In the meantime certain aspects of the landscape have changed; but his sketch was informed by so much insight into the more permanent political and moral values involved by the war that the disturbing events of recent weeks have added to its usefulness without substantially diminishing its truth.

According to M. X, American intervention rendered to the cause of the Allies a special service of enormous value. It finally extinguished the possibility of a victory by Germany. It settled for him the essential matter. It relieved him of the intolerable fear of a world dominated and moulded by the Prussian military caste. Last February, partly because of the Russian reaction and partly because of the submarine, a German victory had become threatening. If the German government had been allowed to unleash the submarine without adding this country to its enemies, its victory would have been more than possible, it would have been probable. But after American intervention it ceased even to be possible. So it seemed to a very intelligent Frenchman two months ago, and if there is any doubt as to the truth of this judgment to-day, it should be indubitably confirmed. There is one job from which the American nation cannot and must not shrink—the job of preventing the ruling class in Germany from consolidating its existing power by presenting to the German people the fruits of victory. On that issue there can be no negotiation and no compromise. Any increased military, naval or industrial preparation on the part of this country which may be necessary to prohibit Germany from winning must be undertaken cheerfully, promptly and without regard to cost.

Such increased preparations will be needed. Even though the Russian army has collapsed, Germany's chief chance of winning depends upon the submarine, and the United States entered the war chiefly for the purpose of defeating the submarine attack. No sufficient assurance has yet been furnished that the submarine is defeated. There remains a real doubt whether the government is building as many destroyers and as much mercantile tonnage as will be required to keep maritime communications open, and such a doubt is intolerable. As soon as possible the shipbuilding program should be substantially increased. The Allies must be able to count upon obtaining either in 1918 or 1919 a supply of tonnage considerably larger than that destroyed by the submarine. The assurance of such a supply would do more than anything else to impair German morale. The authority of the government over its people has been staked on the prospect of victory, and it would not long survive

an absolute assurance of the defeat of their last weapon of possible decision.

The Russian military collapse by encouraging Germany to continue fighting has not only made it desirable to increase the shipbuilding program, but it has also made necessary additions to our purely military preparations. The British and French armies are confronted by a task on the western front even more difficult than was anticipated. It is necessary for them to exercise a steady pressure on the German lines in order to harass and discourage the German army, and such pressure has become increasingly costly since the German Staff has been able to concentrate all its reserves of guns and munitions in the west. They will need more American assistance in making this pressure effective. The proposed American supply at once of munitions, guns, aeroplanes and soldiers should be increased so as to bring home to the Germans the hopelessness of victory, the inexorability of the grinding attack which their occupation of French and Belgian territory righteously exposes them. There can be no assurance of German defeat unless the continued ability of the Allied forces to keep the initiative is placed beyond a doubt. American men and materials must be supplied in sufficient quantities to make them form a substantial and dependable part of the French reserve. Instead of maintaining fifteen or twenty divisions in France, it may be necessary to send not less than thirty divisions, which would imply the training as soon as possible of another 500,000 men; and of course their equipment in aeroplanes and guns should be sufficient to give to each American soldier an intensified fighting efficiency.

It is one thing, however, to close the door to German victory. It is another to open it to a military victory for the Allies. This distinction is not kept sufficiently in mind. Yet unless it is kept in mind American political objects in entering the war take on a confused and doubtful aspect and the scale of American preparations becomes meaningless. The American nation is fully capable of preventing Germany from winning. It is not capable of assuring a military decision to the Allies. Its coöperation might have provided such an assurance in case the Russian army had continued capable of fighting; but under existing conditions no body of troops which the American nation is capable of raising, training and transporting to Europe within three years would be sufficient to win a decisive military victory over Germany. The two million men which the War Department is now preparing to train would be utterly inadequate. The size of the new army would have to be increased to at least six million men; and at least as many more million tons of new shipping would have to be built in order

to carry the soldiers to France and keep them supplied and munitioned. Neither is it desirable that a military decision should be obtained by an American army. Those who advocate this policy fail to understand what a disproportionate and dangerous responsibility this country would assume as a consequence of dispatching a large enough army to Europe to assure the absolute victory of the anti-German Alliance in a quarrel which turns so much on European issues. The American nation should not be asked to guarantee a military decision in favor of the Western Allies. If it did so it would be using the resources of the New World not to redress the balance in the Old, but to upset it disastrously and perhaps irretrievably.

Our French correspondent clearly recognizes the necessary limitations of American military coöperation. He does not count on a military victory as a result of it. As he sees it, its purpose is essentially defensive. It is less an instrument of victory over Germany than a safeguard against victory by Germany. For the victory over Germany M. X looks in an entirely different direction. Thanks to American assistance he expects the Allies to hold out "long enough to bring Germany to a state of distress and convulsion." This expectation was expressed in May and in the meantime much has happened to make it more rather than less plausible. As soon as the impossibility of victory can be brought home to the German people they will begin to feel their moral isolation and to react convulsively against it. Because of the Russian collapse, they may fool themselves with vain expectations during another year; but in the end political disintegration will follow upon the conscious renunciation of victory. The prestige of the ruling class with the German people depends chiefly on its ability to keep alive its past traditions of triumphant leadership.

Should not a frank recognition of the truth that a qualitative or constructive victory depends upon the disintegration of the German morale determine the present strategy of the Allied enemies of Germany? As long as Allied generals and statesmen insist on the need of a military decision which they cannot obtain without the aid of six million Russian or American soldiers, they postpone and perhaps prevent the victory which still lies within their grasp—a victory over the German ruling class obtained with the aid and consent of the German people. If German popular protest against its government is to reach its maximum intensity, it must be nourished by two positive assurances. The Germans must be assured of the utter improbability of victory both by them and over them. It is these assurances which the Russian revolutionary leaders have been seeking to carry home to the German people, and

they have in some measure succeeded. That is why the Russian Revolution, even after the collapse of the Russian army, remains in the words of M. X. even more a great strength than a great weakness. It brings pressure on the Allied governments, as M. X. says, to lean on revolutionary forces, and that is the salutary fact. Unless they lean on revolutionary forces, unless the reconstruction which they are seeking to bring about in international institutions and policy is associated with radical internal reforms not only in Germany but in other countries, the declared purpose of the Allies of contributing to the permanent pacification of the world will be condemned to sterility.

Our French correspondent characterizes American intervention as itself a revolution—as a great moral force joined to a great material force. A revolution in fact it undoubtedly is, but whether it will be a beneficent revolution is still hanging in the balance. Never was the future more obscure. The outcome will depend upon the extent to which the statesmen of the Allies understand how far they are dependent on revolutionary forces for the realization of their declared purposes. There are two essential aspects to the present war. It is necessary above everything else to prevent a German victory, because such a victory would vindicate a peculiarly unscrupulous attempt to carry out exclusive and dangerous political objects by military force. But it is only less necessary to prevent the prodigious fund of military power which has been concentrated in order to resist Germany from being used for purposes inimical to democracy in the countries which are fighting Germany. It is only less necessary to organize resistance inside the Allied nations to those social and political groups which would use a triumph over Germany in the war as a means of consolidating the rule in their own countries of their own class. If the war is ended and the treaty of peace written as a consequence of a decisive military victory over Germany, the governments and ruling classes in all the nations except Germany would be strengthened and vindicated. But if the army and navies are used only for defensive purposes and the effective victory is obtained through some measure of repudiation of their own government by the German people, then the soil would be prepared for those domestic reforms in all the belligerent countries which form an indispensable condition of the organization of international peace. In that case, the Allies would be staking their chances of victory upon the moral superiority of their cause, and the war from their point of view would be converted essentially into a competition in morales—which deserved to be regarded as a useful disciplinary preparation for the colossal problems of an obscure future.

Making Wealth Pay for War

IN time of peace we could claim title to ourselves, at least. Even the poorest and most thoroughly exploited among us could insist upon what was in form adequate inducement before we yielded our time and our efforts. Material possessions that we held under the law we called ours. By effort or by chance we found ourselves established in definite positions in the social scale of wellbeing, and we felt that nothing but our own mistakes or demerits ought to dislodge us. The existing order was not, we recognized, eternal. It was the resultant of forces in momentary equilibrium, forces subject to change. The existing order was not perfect. At innumerable points a slight change in the distribution of social income might produce a great change in happiness and in general efficiency. Nevertheless the conditions of economic life were sufficiently stable and satisfactory to serve as a basis upon which to rest our individual calculations.

Modern warfare respects none of our civil expectations. We who were free may be summoned by the state and forced to execute labors exceeding in arduousness and dangers those of the galley slaves of earlier times. Our very lives the state may pay as a cheap price for a bit of terrain prized by the strategists. It would be absurd, then, to expect the state to be over-nice in its respect for our property or economic status. The state will take what it needs. The only rational limit upon its exactions lie in considerations of productive efficiency. The state will not wisely take from the poor man the little that he has, because in doing so it would lose the poor man's productive power. For the same reason the state will wisely leave in the hands of the rich man so much of his income as may be necessary to assure his coöperation. War taxation has no place for other principles than that of productive efficiency. Peace taxation may be guided by other principles as well.

Elsewhere in this issue we print a letter taking more or less violent exception to the plan of levying upon the larger incomes for the direct and indirect charges of the war. This war is our common enterprise; should not every man be called upon to pay for it according to his ability? Besides, how is it possible for the rich to pay for the war? Take away the large incomes and you take away the luxuries of the rich. But how far will those luxuries serve to sustain the soldiers in the field or the munition workers in the factory?

This criticism involves a point of political morality and a point of economic practicability. With regard to the former, it may be admitted that every man should pay for the war according to his ability.

But the fact remains that we have in the United States millions of households that do not now command incomes sufficient to maintain them in good health and at a high level of productive efficiency. According to the most reliable calculations we have, those of Dr. King, *Wealth and Income of the People of the United States*, one half the families of the United States received in 1910 incomes of \$800 or less. Seventy per cent of the families received incomes of \$1,000 or less. Such incomes, it will be agreed, represented little but the barest necessities of existence.

Since 1910 there have been general advances in wages, but the prices of commodities have risen in still greater proportion. The fact thus remains that a majority of our population find it hard to make ends meet. Shall we attempt to take from them some part of their income for financing the war? We should do this at our national peril. We should reduce productive efficiency, and this is something we cannot afford to do in war. Indeed, the logic of war requires that we should bring public pressure to bear to raise incomes for this class to the highest efficiency level, at the temporary expense, if necessary, of the more fortunate taxpayers. The unprecedented prosperity and efficiency of the British working classes since the war has been due in large part to just such a transfer of income, either through borrowings or through taxation, from the wealthier classes. The question whether such a redistribution of income could be justified on general grounds of political morality may as well be waived. Britain was waging war upon the strength of her productive resources, and was ready to pay whatever price might be required to raise her productive power to the highest level.

According to Dr. King's calculations something less than one per cent of American families enjoyed incomes of \$6,000 and over. This class received in the aggregate fourteen per cent of the national income. Some ten per cent of the national income fell to families with incomes of \$3,000 to \$6,000. Now it is plain that incomes from \$3,000 to \$6,000 can bear moderate taxes, and incomes from \$6,000 upwards can bear heavy taxes without impairment of the health and personal efficiency of their recipients. Between them these classes receive not less than ten billions a year. Much of this should be taken in taxation.

In this doctrine there is not even an implied premise of equalitarianism. There is no intimation of the undesirability of a social order that generates on the one hand great fortunes and on the other hand vast classes who cannot command the essentials of efficiency and decent existence. We may believe that such an order might profitably be modified, but this is a question to be

threshed out in time of peace. For the present we are merely taking seriously the part that America must play in the war. Thus we are forced to an acceptance in principle of any financial measures that are calculated to increase our productive efficiency. As it happens, this involves abandoning all attempts at distribution of taxation evenly upon all incomes, great and small. It may also involve increasing the command of our lower-paid workers over the necessities of life, even at the expense of other classes—if indeed this is economically practicable.

It is a very ancient doctrine that the presence of the wealthy in society affects only in a negligible degree the volume of real consumable wealth that is placed at the disposal of the unprivileged masses. What, after all, does the multimillionaire take out of the common stock? He probably consumes less ounces of meat and bread than does the ordinary navvy. Though he may revel in fine raiment, his demands upon the social stock of textile materials are insignificant. The wood and stone that compose his mansion would not go very far in the construction of a tenement house. The coal that warms him would add but few lumps to the grates of the poor. The rich man may spend hundreds of thousands on his home, but all he gets in the end is his food and clothing and a roof over his head. That is what you would really take away from him if you took away his income. That is what you would have to divide among the many-headed proletariat. That is what you would have with which to stop the voracious maw of war.

Isn't this doctrine plausible? And if it is sound as well, all projects of levying heavy taxes upon the rich, for peace or for war, must result in disillusionment. It is equally useless to try to defray the costs of war through loans raised among the wealthy classes. The rich man's purse is trash, not worth the state's taking. It remains true that there are multitudes who have not enough meat and bread, clothing and fuel, but that is because there is not enough of these good things to go round, not because they are badly distributed. We seem to be the victims of a niggardly nature, after all, not of perverse human institutions.

A very pretty exercise in logic could be made out of this thesis. But the present is no time for logical plausibilities. Everybody would admit that little good would come of redistributing the physical commodities upon which income is spent at the moment. But the income of to-day commands the production of to-morrow. Does one hundred thousand dollars fall to one man, or to a thousand? In the former case—assuming that it is to be spent, not invested—an order goes forth to society to devote an enormous amount of labor

to the elaboration of a tiny bit of material. Or if the material admits of little elaboration—a mutton chop, say—the order goes forth for a number of able-bodied men to see that it gets safely from the gridiron to the table. In case the hundred thousand dollars is divided into a thousand portions, quite different orders go forth. Society is bidden to elaborate the material only so much as is necessary for plain serviceability. One man serves ten mutton chops instead of ten men (in effect) serving one. Dives may eat no more than Lazarus, personally, but through his demand for elaboration and style, he eats stupendously by proxy. He is a huge consumer of productive power, and it is productive power that we specially require, for war and for reconstruction from war.

It is to be understood that the argument implies nothing in the way of a peace-time social philosophy. We do not overlook the fact that style and elaboration play an extremely important part in technical progress. What was a millionaire's plaything may become in the end a convenience of the multitude. In time of peace the impetus to improvement given by inequality of income may be worth the cost. But we are at war, and need all our energies for tangible, immediate results.

It is entirely practicable to take part of the larger incomes in society and use them to make the productive system yield much more abundantly the things needed by the soldiers in the trenches and the workers in the munitions plants at home. What is involved is merely a shifting of the channels of productive power. Such a shifting cannot occur, to be sure, without temporary loss. Much skill, many habits of work and service, are adapted especially to the existing scheme of distribution. But war entails many dislocations more serious than this.

In the argument it has been assumed that the large income is actually spent. This is an assumption valid only to a limited degree in America. The builder of a large fortune is most likely to be of more or less frugal habits; he satisfies his wants simply and invests the greater part of his income. Only where large fortunes are of long standing are we likely to find their possessors actually living up to their incomes. Our large fortunes are young, and it is a safe inference that they are yielding very copiously to the flow of new capital. In ordinary times they play an extremely important part in equipping the nation with banks, mills, railways and other instruments of productive power. Possibly a more equal distribution of income would have resulted in general thrift, yielding as large savings for investment in productive equipment. This does not seem probable. At any rate, economic history indicates quite clearly that rapid

accumulation of capital and great inequalities in fortune go hand in hand.

This consideration, so far as it goes, makes against the policy of excessive inroads upon large incomes in time of peace, at least in periods of rapid industrial expansion. As between raising the standard of living in the present and increasing the capital equipment that will make possible a still better standard of living in the future, one may well hesitate before passing judgment. But in time of war, except in the war industries proper, the formation of capital is at a standstill. A nation threatened by defeat has more immediate uses for available funds. England, for example, has actually discouraged ordinary investments, in order to divert all savings to war loans. Now, it has not the slightest bearing upon the national productive equipment whether surplus income is drawn from its recipient in the form of taxes or in the form of subscriptions to war loans. The "capital" represented by war loans spins no wool, grinds no wheat, moves no freight. It is an instrument not of production of future social income, but of its distribution.

In so far as war taxes fall upon large incomes that would actually be spent, they divert productive power from uses that are relatively unimportant to uses that are vital to the nation. In so far as they fall upon surpluses that would be saved, they are indifferent, from the point of view of war. On the whole, such taxes increase a nation's chances of victory. That is their justification, and it is sufficient.

"Gomperian Forcefulness"

THE London Morning Post and the New York Times unite in hailing Mr. Gompers as the new savior of democracy from the black forces of German duplicity and intrigue. At a meeting held in Paris during the last days of July, representatives of organized labor from England joined with the administrative committee of the French Socialist Party in acceding to the appeal of the delegates of the Russian Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies for an international labor conference "at Stockholm, or, if that city should prove inconvenient, at Christiania or any other city." Believing it essential that American labor should participate in this conference, the Secretaries of the British General Federation of Trade Unions and the French Federation Générale du Travail invited the American Federation of Labor through Mr. Gompers to send delegates. Mr. Gompers firmly declined. "Such a conference," he answered, "cannot at this time or in the near future be pro-

ductive of good, and as far as the American Federation of Labor is concerned, it will not send representatives." "That," comments the New York Times, "is the voice of the American Trade Unions. . . . Mr. Gompers has set a noble example for the British Labor Party to follow." And the Tory London Morning Post, quite as renowned as our own Times for its tender devotion to trade unions, already detects a welcome stiffening of backbone among "our paltering Ministers" under the bracing influence of "Gomperian Forcefulness."

No one at all familiar with Mr. Gompers's long years of consecrated service in the interest of American wage-workers can fail to rejoice at this tardy recognition of his courage and ability by anti-labor papers. More than any other one man, he is responsible for the salutary influence which organized labor exerts upon American life. In the face of bitter opposition from the conservative press, often in the face of vilification and slander, he has been fearless in his leadership of the American Federation of Labor, which he helped to organize in 1881 and of which since 1882, with the intermission of a single year, he has been executive head. Since the outbreak of our war with Germany, he has been tireless in support of the government. To his prestige and generalship as much as to any other one cause the country is indebted for the fact that in spite of its deep pacifist sentiment, organized labor has loyally subordinated its class interests to the larger interest of the nation.

In shaping his war policy, Mr. Gompers definitely followed the example of the British labor leaders from whom, rather than from the labor leaders of France or Germany or Italy, the American Federation of Labor has traditionally drawn its inspiration. Like them, Mr. Gompers was a pronounced pacifist before the beginning of the war. Like them, he was disposed to look with indulgence upon the general strike as an instrument which the workers would be justified in using to paralyze all wars which they themselves did not sanction as wars of national self-defense. Like them, his attitude toward the present war was determined by the German invasion of Belgium and especially by the support which the German trade-unionists and Socialists gave to their government before and after that brutal outrage. So much did he rely upon the force of British example that he prevailed upon Mr. Lloyd-George to send representatives of organized labor with the Balfour mission to interpret the war policy of British labor to organized labor in America. But now when representative British labor leaders join with the labor leaders of France and Russia in advocacy of an international labor conference to define the "war aims" of all the belligerents, Mr. Gompers parts company with

them and elects to align himself instead with the New York Times and the London Morning Post.

Mr. Gompers has rendered important services to the government since our declaration of war. But his service has certainly not been greater than that which Mr. Arthur Henderson, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the British Labor party and member of the British War Cabinet has rendered to the government of Great Britain; neither can it be fairly rated above the service which M. Thomas of the French Socialist party has rendered to the French government as its Minister of Munitions. Neither Mr. Henderson nor M. Thomas are under the remotest suspicion of pro-Germanism. They are not sentimental pacifists. After the experience of the past three years, it is highly improbable that they have suddenly become the dupes of German intrigue. Yet both of them appear to be promoting the international labor conference which Mr. Gompers prejudices as untimely and futile.

In explanation of his forceful decision, Mr. Gompers declares that "Kaiserism and Prussianism must be crushed or made to surrender to the demands of the democracies of the world before a conference is feasible." But how is Kaiserism to be made to surrender to the democracies of the world? Does Mr. Gompers imagine that Mr. Henderson and M. Thomas are less passionate in their hatred of Prussianism than he? A year or so ago, the statesmen of Europe, including the labor leaders in the allied countries, spoke with the same forceful finality with which Mr. Gompers speaks now. They were all "bitter-enders." Season after season, they looked to the starvation of Germany or to a decisive "big push" to bring those "more favorable results" without which Mr. Gompers still holds that no international labor conference can be advantageously held. During recent months, however, a change has been manifest in their tone. There is no foolish disposition to relax the prosecution of the war. Men like Mr. Henderson and M. Thomas undoubtedly recognize that a negotiated peace on terms which the democratic nations could accept will probably have to await the issue on the western front. But where they seem to differ from Mr. Gompers is in the larger importance which they attach to the working of the Russian revolutionary ferment among German trade-unionists and Socialists.

By an oversight rather than by grace of the British censor, the first numbers of the official Bulletin of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, published in March, have recently found their way into this country. They slipped in disguised in copies of a certain Russian liberal paper which the British guardians of American intel-

ligence have from the beginning of the revolution considered it safe to permit Americans to read. Examined in the light of the present program of the Council, they convey a totally different impression of the Russian situation from that produced by our newspaper headlines. For weeks Russia has appeared to be reeling into a maelstrom of disorganization and anarchy. The mad activities of the Maximalists, the fevered rise and fall of provisional governments, the headlong flight of Korniloff's armies to the Galician frontier have monopolized the dispatches. But the Bulletin makes it clear that these are only the high lights of the main Russian story.

From the days immediately following the overthrow of the Czar to the present moment, the Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies have held tenaciously to the program which they adopted then. They have insisted upon keeping in their own hands the control of Russia's internal affairs. Through subsidiary councils organized throughout the country, through coöperative societies and local dumas, they have carried on a sustained campaign of education to prepare the people for the work of the Constituent Assembly. From the beginning they were definitely against a separate peace. But they knew that the Russian people, having deposed the Czar, could not be made to fight for "the imperialistic designs of the Romanoffs." With millions of idle acres back home, they knew that the great masses of hungry peasants could not be rallied to a war of conquest. For this reason, they immediately decided to abandon Galicia, to relinquish all claims to Constantinople and to advocate the establishment of an independent Poland. But not for this reason only. For years their revolutionary movement had drawn heavy moral and financial support from the German Socialists. They had fraternized with the German troops at the front. They believed that if they could win Russia's allies to their program of "no forcible annexations, no punitive indemnities," they would win a new ally for the war against autocracy in Germany itself.

In the face of the German offensive in Galicia, this program must seem to most Americans, as it no doubt seems to Mr. Gompers, fantastic and absurd. But so strong a supporter of the war as The New Europe of London attributes the paralysis of the Russian armies largely to the failure of allied statesmen to meet the proposals of the Russian Council with a "clearly-defined and generally intelligible statement of their war aims." The Russian Revolution gave the western statesmen an opportunity—which they have neglected to capitalize—"to set so democratic a stamp upon Allied war aims as to begin to undermine German belief in the legend

that the Allies are striving to accomplish the destruction of the German people." The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies still believes that a new statement of war aims in the spirit if not in the letter of their formula is essential to the restoration of Russia's military power and her preservation from momentary demoralization and anarchy. They still have faith that such a statement, by its effect upon the German people, would give the Allies an alternative to a crushing military victory for the accomplishment of their democratic aims. Even if it failed to produce any such effect in Germany it would yet serve, they believe, to put the stamp of absolute justice upon the cause of the Allies and fortify their moral resolution. Since the statesmen in the Allied cabinets have rebuffed them, they have turned to the representatives of organized labor for a sympathetic hearing. The administrative committee of the French Socialist party have agreed to send delegates to the international labor conference which they have organized. As chairman of the executive committee of the British Labor party, Mr. Henderson has apparently undertaken to recommend similar action to his colleagues. Mr. Gompers alone, as the spokesman of organized labor in democratic America, has flatly rejected their appeal. The British Labor party may follow Mr. Gompers's "noble example" and overrule Mr. Henderson. If, however, they should sustain him, Mr. Gompers's forcefulness will remain unsupported as a bitter disillusionment not only to the sorely tried workers of Russia, but to the organized workers throughout the democratic world. If his influence prevails, it may be disastrous to the cause of democracy. Even if it does not prevail, his action will be injurious to the faith of liberals everywhere in American labor.

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The Inter-Allied Conference

Until German military power is broken there can be no real settlement, security or peace, and it is no use talking of those things. Win the war first, and then when Alsace-Lorraine has been restored and the other necessary territorial rectifications made, we can talk of real security and a League of Nations.

SUCH has been the formula of Allied statecraft since the beginning of the war. It is not only the governmental but the popular view; that even of Pacifists, of the League to Enforce Peace. It is the dominant note of the American press to-day. It seems to inspire the American Federation of Labor.

But the last two or three debates in the House of Commons, the threatened rupture in the French government, the recent change in the attitude of ministers like Arthur Henderson in England and Albert Thomas in France; the unyielding insistence of Russia, and even speeches in the American Senate indicate a growing realization that our ultimate victory depends upon our abandoning this formula, and very nearly inverting it. Inversion, indeed, brings us a good deal nearer to the obvious truth, thus:

The German military power cannot be broken until we have talked peace to the German people—until they know in what their security will consist when their militarism has been destroyed, and what their political and economic fate will be. We cannot get the frontiers drawn on lines of nationality and popular will, until we have devised some plan of security which will make strategic frontiers unnecessary, or at least less imperative.

It is not a question of whether it is theoretically possible to annihilate in a military sense a virile people of a hundred million souls, standing solidly with their government in a favorable strategic position, though all experience would indicate the hopelessness of such a task.

The point is that by turning such a war into one of self-defense on the part of the enemy, and so welding government and people firmly together, we render the military task immeasurably more difficult and add unnecessarily to its cost in life, treasure, freedom and social values of the future, and risk ultimate failure. And the suggestion here made is that the policy of the first formula does just that thing. A war of German aggression, inimical to the real interests of the people, which they would recognize as such if Allied diplomacy since the war had been wiser, is by Allied refusal to define such an aim as "the destruction of German militarism," made to appear to the German

people as a war of national defense for their vital rights and interests. By proclaiming our intention to "break German military power," or "destroy German militarism," without indicating what is to replace that as the means of German national defense, we do in fact, however unintentionally, compel the Germans to fight for the right to have any security at all, the war becoming for them one of self-defense in the simplest sense of the term.

Thus, Mr. Asquith's vagueness enabled Bethmann-Hollweg to retort in the Reichstag (April 6th, 1916): "Mr. Asquith's primary condition means that Germany is to be rendered helpless again as in centuries past, exposed by her neighbors' lust for power. . . . That is what our foes understand by the destruction of Prussian militarism." Such an appeal has deeper material and traditional roots in Germany than in any other country, perhaps.

Mr. Gerard, in his book, *My Four Years in Germany*, says:

We are engaged in war against a people whose country was for so many centuries a theatre of devastating wars that fear is bred into the very marrow of their souls, making them ready to submit their lives and fortunes to an autocracy which for centuries has ground their faces, but which has promised them as the result of the war . . . security.

And that same fear stands in the way of the territorial settlements. Even the German government dares not propose the annexation of Belgium as a sheer act of conquest. But if it could make out a case for the suggestion that Belgium might be used as the base of enemy operations against Germany, it could hope to justify, in the eyes of the German people, the military control of Belgium, provided that the security of Germany has to depend in the future merely upon her own power. It was on grounds of strategic necessity that the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was accomplished against an otherwise hostile civil German opinion in 1872.

Mr. Gerard tells us that the motive next in potency to security which induces the German people to support their government is the economic one. What is to be the economic position of the German people if they fail to support the war? The only positive assurance they have had on that point was at the Paris Economic Conference, where, as an inducement to stop fighting they were told that if they did, a concerted effort would be made to ruin their overseas trade in the future. And that helped

to justify, to the German people, all the aggression involved in the Mitteleuropa scheme.

It is no reply to this point to repeat the very general declarations of the Allies that they favor a "fair and just" settlement. Who is to be judge? What will be "fair" treatment of Germans in the territorial settlement, in the future access to the economic opportunities, raw materials and markets of Africa, Asia and the overseas world generally? Allied statesmanship has even blandly ignored certain indispensable economic conditions of their own territorial demands. The retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine might be made possible if certain arrangements as to German access to coal and iron were made. An air of absolute unreality—from the German point of view—is given to the whole demand by simply ignoring that phase of the subject. To fight for the right to bargain about such things on terms of something like equality is to fight a war of defense.

We find the same situation if we conceive of the war as a problem of the democratization of Germany. The absence of any common Allied plan of security, sufficiently definite to be a visible and striking policy, makes any anti-governmental movement in Germany almost impossible. Yet we do not even pretend that the democratization of Germany is something which we can accomplish by military means. "No one is foolish enough to suppose," said Mr. Balfour in the House of Commons last week, "that it would be possible to impose on Germany a constitution made outside Germany." Whether certain present tendencies would result in final democratization he did not know. "But this I know," he added: "If democracy is not established in Germany the security of Europe will not be established either." But if it cannot be done by military means, as Mr. Balfour admits, why do we not uncover others?

A few days before Mr. Balfour's speech, Mr. Lansing had asked this rhetorical question:

When will the German people awaken to the truth?
When will they arise in their might and cast off the yoke?

And a week or two previously to that, the Berlin Vorwaerts had said this:

It is all very well for the Allies to talk of the German people rebelling against their government; but if they did the Entente armies would be in Cologne in a week.

If the German people are to be brought to see that they are not fighting a war of defense, if the support which they give their government is to be undermined, if Germany is to be democratized, if the way is to be prepared for territorial concessions necessary for the better Europe, it must be

made plain that the Allied policy offers to a democratized and law-abiding Germany a security greater than that which she can enjoy under a militarist and autocratic regimen. And that cannot be done by a mere general diplomatic declaration of ultimate intention. As the President has most truly said, war aims, when stated in general terms, seem the same on both sides. The plans of the Allies for post-bellum security must take shape sufficiently to form a recognizable policy; to strike the imagination of the German people, and to be, themselves, obviously of democratic inspiration and promise.

The matter is urgent because of the impending Inter-Allied Conference on War Aims. If that Conference is to be of the old order of Inter-Allied Conferences, putting first the territorial readjustments and leaving in the vague background the problem of security, it might well, for all the reasons that have just been reviewed, make the whole situation worse and not better. But if the emphasis is placed upon the problem of security, and the democratic organization of Europe forecast by the form of the Conference itself, the effect upon movements in Germany might be such as to be worth, in terms of Allied aims, very many army corps.

The actual step which would carry into effect the general principle here urged, would be the convening of the Inter-Allied Conference on such lines as these:

Object:

To frame the international arrangements for mutual protection by which after the war the nations of the Alliance—and ultimately those of the world—are to be assured military security, national independence, and economic rights (access to raw materials and markets, equality of opportunity in undeveloped territory like Africa, Asia and South America, access to the sea for states that have insufficient, or no, ports, etc.), some plan for a League of Nations, such as that forecast by Mr. Wilson and approved by the other leading Allied statesmen.

Composition:

The Congress to consist of two bodies, a smaller one composed, as in international Congresses of the past, of the delegates or nominees of the governments participating, and a larger body representing proportionately the component parties of the respective parliaments.

Method:

The smaller body should act as the initiating and drafting committee, their proposals being subject to amendment, approval or rejection by the larger body before being finally ratified by the constituent states of the Congress.

The Conference, in view of the new belligerents

that have since entered the war, would be much larger and more impressive than the Paris Economic Conference of last year; it would, of course, sit for weeks or even months, with full reports in the neutral press, arrangements being made for those reports to reach liberal and Socialist minorities in Germany and Austria. Thus, although the Conference would make no formal communication to the Central Powers its decisions would in fact constitute communications to the German peoples.

The reason for the special composition of the conference is obvious. If the Allies employ that method as between themselves, they will be in a position to insist, when they come to deal with Germany at the end of the war, that she be represented in that way at the congress of the settlement. That would make German Socialists and liberals, not governmental delegates and Prussians, the predominant element of German representation at the peace settlement. And of course we should have enlisted German democratic support of the plan. We should, by this fact, have democratized Germany in her international relations. And it is those relations, of course, with which we are concerned.

The principle would also, in the same way, give to Austrian representation not purely a governmental or Hapsburg character, but would ensure a fair representation of the subject nationalities of the Central Empires. The publicity given to their case would be a powerful plea in their fight for autonomy. But the justification of this form of congress goes beyond mere expediency.

Mr. Wilson, among others, has emphasized the danger to the world in the Prussian system, by which a little clique of men deal with the lives and destinies of millions without consultation, without even consent. A system under which it is possible for the fate of a whole people to be settled in secret by a tiny group is one which we have been told so often the world had to destroy.

But, if we follow the methods of the past in international settlements, it is this very system which we shall sanction, and employ. And a war waged for the purpose of "making the world safe for democracy" will end in a settlement, or group of decisions—the most momentous decisions of history—arrived at by methods and machinery as autocratic and anti-democratic as the Prussian government itself. Germany will be in a position to make a "governmental" peace, disregarding any expressed will of its people, for the simple reason that the machinery of diplomacy has never made any real provision for such expression, while the political situation at the end of a long war is always in fact averse to it.

Because "democracy is a bad war maker," democratic machinery is always suspended during war, and government, for the special purposes of war, often given into the hands of persons or parties possessing no popular mandate to enforce general policy. That in large part is the situation in Europe to-day. Power has been conferred and transferred without much reference to the politics of incumbents. Yet political opinion—especially with reference to such things as free trade and protection, popular right, national aspirations, the kind of world we want in the future—will matter very much indeed in the settlement.

But there are other considerations not less important. In a conference composed of delegates nominated by governments, each delegate is in the position of a lawyer representing his client. He will be sensitive to home criticism of a "nationalist" kind, particularly if he is looking to a successful future in the political life of his country. But, under the system suggested, the chief responsibility for the character of terms finally agreed to by the conference would lie with the larger body. He would therefore feel covered, and take freer hand for a liberal give-and-take settlement. A body composed of "British," "American," "French," "Italian" delegates would be a body which necessarily divided on the questions at issue on lines of national division. On such questions as Sea Law, the Open Door, Access to Raw Materials, Economic Rights of Way, Territorial Divisions, the British delegate would necessarily stand for "British" conceptions as opposed to American or Italian, as the case might be. But a body in which British conservatives would be advocating a solution opposed to that advocated by British radicals or socialists, but in agreement with that supported by French or American conservatives, and opposed by French or American radicals and socialists, would be a body in which the sharpness and rigidity of national divisions would be lessened and in which rival principles of settlement rather than rival national interests would be the predominant issue.

Machinery of this kind is, of course, most cumbersome, and quite impossible where rapid decisions are wanted. But in the case of neither of these congresses would rapidity of decision be the chief need. In the one case the main object would be to get certain pronouncements of policy home to the German democrats, and for that purpose a long conference might be desirable. At the close of the war a long period of "provisional settlement" which can be modified, would probably be a good thing. Rapidity of settlement would not, in that case either, be the main need.

NORMAN ANGELL.

A Victory for Efficiency

MR. WILSON'S creation of a War Industries Board under the Council of National Defense is the most encouraging administrative event that has happened since the war began; because it is our first vigorous drive toward the principle of administrative unity; and when we examine the ground it covers and the strategic approach it makes to yet other ground beyond, we are justified in regarding it as a victory for which our commander-in-chief deserves a great deal more applause than it has brought him. His letter to his fellow-countrymen on prices and morals, which brought him enormous applause, was for the most part a mere rattling of a sword in a megaphonic scabbard, where, by the way, after a month, it still resides, with prices still unscathed. His War Industries Board is a genuine effective action, followed, in comparison, by silence. Such, we may observe with grief, are the experiences that tend to turn the mass of politicians, according to their temperaments, into garrulous demagogues or burrowing cynics.

The War Industries Board supplants an arrangement under which no comprehensive unified view of our industrial war needs was ever likely to be reached. The War Department and the Navy Department, desiring industrial professional knowledge and advice to guide them in their purchases, were obliged to resort to at least three separate main bodies of business men. For the organization and development of our industries which manufacture finished weapons of warfare, they went, of course, primarily to Mr. Scott's General Munitions Board, but for the organization and development of our industries which manufacture foods and clothes they went primarily to Mr. Rosenwald's various committees on "Supplies," and for the organization and development of our elemental industries which produce our basic natural-resource commodities—such as lumber, metal, oil, wool—they went primarily to Mr. Baruch's various committees on "Raw Materials"; and Mr. Scott and Mr. Rosenwald and Mr. Baruch occupied three separate spheres of influence with no common immediate sovereign. In fact, it was sometimes a matter of strong doubt whether Mr. Rosenwald and Mr. Baruch had any sovereign at all, short of the President. They acted as members of the "Advisory Commission," and the "Advisory Commission" was permitted in many ways to develop into one more island of the free in the great free archipelago of Washingtonian war-

time administrative departments and commissions.

Under the new arrangement the War Department and the Navy Department, for the organization and development of all of our manufacturing and extractive industries, will go primarily to one central body—the War Industries Board—which will report unitedly and responsibly and continuously to the Council of National Defense itself and which will become our one central repository and radiator of practical industrial information for war purposes. Inevitably, through being uniquely and concentratedly possessed of this information, it will extend its service beyond the War Department and the Navy Department to our new third great governmental purchaser, the Emergency Fleet Corporation. It will serve all our important governmental purchasers, through recommendations bearing on purchases and prices and priorities and contracts; and, through this unified knowledge and this unified pressure, it is bound to accelerate those contracts wherever acceleration is needed. It will have a strategic power which, if left to its natural development, will be irresistible.

In times past an advisory committee or sub-committee would study a purchase problem presented to it by, for instance, the War Department; and it would make a complete recommendation, leading to a contract; and it would take that recommendation and drop it into the entrance-slot of the War Department machine; and then the wheels within that machine would turn and grind for perhaps four weeks, six weeks, even eight weeks, before the contract would be extruded from the exit-slot into the factory of the contractor. The time elapsing between the moment when the Department decided to make a purchase and the moment when it actually let the contract was, in the beginning, often scandalous. It has been much shortened by even the divided pressures coming from divided and sub-divided advisory committees—welcomed, admirably, by most Department officials and strengthened, again admirably, by Mr. Baker's own notable personal qualities of inquisitive intelligence and pervasive industriousness. And it is likely to be shortened in the future much more rapidly than in the past.

It is significantly rumored now that Mr. Baker has it in his mind, besides being intelligent and industrious, to be a regular conventional informed business executive, adopting methods which often seem to enable a business executive in private life to dispense with intelligence largely and with indus-

triousness altogether. He will have, one hears it said in the environs of the War Department, a daily report of progress laid on his desk, showing him, tabulated and totaled, all the purchases needed by the Department, all the recommendations made by the War Industries Board, all the contracts actually let, all the deliveries promised, and all the deliveries actually made, with dates, and therefore with delays located and responsibilities disclosed.

With Mr. Baker thus enlightened, the recommendations of the War Industries Board, falling upon the War Department with unified and concentrated force and frequency, will show us, within a few months, one of two results. Either the War Department machine will keep pace with those recommendations, or else those recommendations will crack that machine and will reveal the wreck to Mr. Baker and to the public. In the latter case the transfer of the contract-making powers of the War Department to the War Industries Board will become glaringly inevitable, and the War Industries Board will become a full-powered Ministry of Munitions. In either case we shall get purchasing action. Our achieved unity of advice in purchases, if we retain and consolidate it, puts us in a position from which we are bound to be able to capture our final objective—purchasing action, rapid and decisive.

In this unity of advice, however, there is one particularly conspicuous gap. The Aircraft Production Board is not included. It remains outside the War Industries Board, paralleling it and advising the War Department and the Navy Department independently on aircraft and aircraft equipment. Its omission lends color to the rumor that there is a plan for removing it altogether from the Council of National Defense and for absorbing it into the War Department.

Any such plan is an utter denial of the whole of the principle which has given us the Council of National Defense, as well as of the whole of the principle which has given us the War Industries Board. The purpose of the Council is to get unity in all war affairs. The purpose of the business bodies under the Council is to give us fresh civilian initiative, undepartmentalized, in the forwarding of war purchases. The purpose of the War Industries Board is to give us unity in the management of that initiative.

Inside the War Industries Board, under Mr. Baruch, who remains a member of the Advisory Commission but becomes also a member of the Board, there is a division of "Raw Materials," dealing with the woods and metals of which aircraft must be made; and, under Mr. Brookings, there is

a division of "Finished Products." Aircraft are "Finished Products," just as much as shells or shoes or siege-guns. The right place for the Aircraft Production Board, if it is to be shifted from its present place, is in a large and honorable annex to the "Finished Products" division of the War Industries Board. To take it away from the Council of National Defense altogether would simply mean that the administration was pulling the unity-lever with one hand and then pulling the disunity-lever with the other. And its creation of a War Industries Board is such a strong and apparently purposeful pull in the one direction that a pull in the other direction would be peculiarly pitiful.

Three minor merits of the War Industries Board remain to be mentioned. They are minor to unity and yet, for personal political success, they are of great immediate importance.

The first of them is the personality of the chairman, Mr. Scott. Mr. Scott has already accomplished what was thought at Washington to be impossible. He has aroused a stir of personal enthusiasm, first for the General Munitions Board and now for the War Industries Board, in the breasts of certain critical and crucial military men in the War Department who, it was thought, were obdurate to the charms of any such civilian intrusions into military affairs. They were not obdurate to the charms of Mr. Scott.

He turned out, for one thing, to be a war fan, capable of conversing at length on the battles of the Civil War, the Mexican War, the Revolutionary War, and other wars, thus demonstrating the horse-sense of his mental interests. In consequence of these interests, he turned out also to have a most genuine admiration and liking for military men, and from the day of his arrival in Washington, he has been as zealous for the indispensability of military technical knowledge as for the indispensability of civilian commercial technical knowledge in the purchasing of war-supplies. He has been a positively providential bridge between the civilian and the military ways of thinking.

Further, he is a very great diplomat. He must have been born a diplomat, but he additionally served ten years as secretary of the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce before he became secretary and treasurer and manager of the Warner and Swasey manufacturing company. That is, he learned to deal with groups of men over whom he had no power of "hire-and-fire" before he became an employer. He was, in essence, a politician before he became a business man. By temperament and by experience he walks unautocratically and sure-footedly through many places in Washington

where many "I-say-to-one-man-go-and-he-goeth-and-to-another-come-and-he-cometh" business men have stumbled and fallen.

And he is a man of excellent executive ability. It has been marked not only by his colleagues but by members of foreign technical Missions, several of whom picked him out a long time ago as the most probable man in sight to be selected finally to be the head of our American munitions activities. Part of his ability is related to his diplomacy. It is the remarkably unclouded temper of his mind. He has a most curious way of withdrawing his mind from one object and of then focusing it on another so definitely, so deliberately, that one can almost hear the accompanying click. It is more than a mannerism. It is a method, conscious or unconscious. The result of it is that his mind never gets blurred by impressions. He takes them in sequence, uses them, and files or discards them. At the end of a day he is usually almost as receptive and forceful as he was at the beginning.

Further, he comes from the same town with Mr. Baker, and, it is whispered, calls him "Newton" or perhaps even "Newt." At any rate, they are friends.

As chairman of a board of seven coöperating with the War Department, Mr. Scott will need friendship and great ability and even greater diplomacy. He has them. He is, by the card, an almost perfect appointment.

The Board's second minor merit is that it includes Mr. Hugh Frayne, of the American Federation of Labor.

The dangerous point in the mental equipment of the business men who will have to deal with the government as contractors and as producers-in-general during the war is not in their desire, sometimes real but oftener merely fancied and imputed, to charge the government excessive prices. In the matter of prices it is not only true that the government, through its commandeering law, has them bound and gagged, but it is also true that in any case they would, in the end, do whatever the government firmly and definitely told them to do. They could understand, even if worst came to worst, the "patriotism" of "giving their money to the war." The writer of these lines is willing to stand up and be counted among those simple credulous souls who still believe, after an acquaintance of many working years with business men of all sorts, that in their composite commercialized bosom the sentiment of "patriotism" and of financial sacrifice to "patriotism" is at least as ardent as in the composite uncommercialized swan-white bosom of any other class of people. Their dangerous point is elsewhere. It is in the matter of labor.

A man acquainted with foreign industrial and

political affairs who will spend three months in Washington meeting business men coming on war business to the national capital from all parts of the United States would find it difficult not to conclude that American business men, all in all, are the most reactionary class of industrial rulers in the civilized world. For an astonishing number of them the whole labor movement, which has given us trade union governments in the Antipodes and cabinets speckled with Socialists in virtually every free country in Europe, is not a movement at all. It is nothing but a "trouble." The very same thing that is shaking Russia, and therefore shaking and remaking the world, thrusts a finger in their factories, and they see nothing but a "labor trouble," invented by irrelevant agitators, now presumably always German.

In these circumstances, with the American labor sky full of clouds of a very great blackness, the presence of a labor man on the War Industries Board to try to convey an insight into reality to the business men whom the Board will touch may be most useful. Mr. Gompers's appointment to the "Advisory Commission" was by no means in itself enough. The "Advisory Commission" is a vague place. The War Industries Board is much more solid. Mr. Frayne is our first labor man to be put into actual official governmental contact with the daily practical processes through which our industries will be organized and developed for war-purposes. It is an appointment of the utmost political value in the widest sense of the word political.

Finally, the War Industries Board will staunch the flow of indiscriminate scandal-mongering. No longer will it be possible, on the floor of the Senate or elsewhere, to intimate at large that multitudinous surreptitious committees and sub-committees are "advising" the War Department and the Navy Department to pay excessive prices for the products of their own mines and mills. "Advice" about prices can now go to the War Department from one committee, one board, one set of advisers. If Senators now want to charge a general promotion of graft, they may charge it against precisely seven known, well known, men—Mr. Scott, Mr. Baruch, Mr. Brookings, Mr. Lovett, Mr. Frayne, Colonel Pierce and Admiral Fletcher. The responsibility for honesty in government contracts is consolidated and clarified.

It is a good victory. It is a victory administratively, and then personally and politically and morally. It is not a victory in the main field, which is the field of unity in war-policy as a whole, but, in its own field, of unity in war-purchases, it is a good victory indeed.

WILLIAM HARD.

Food Salvage in New York

THE diagram shown below gives some idea of the many channels through which food passes on its long journey from the grower to the New York City consumer. Perhaps, too, the diagram may help to explain the demand, heard so frequently in days of stress such as we are now going through, that the city be permitted to buy from the farmer and to sell in public markets direct to the housekeeper, eliminating for the time the many middlemen, or at least supplementing their work. There will still be enough business for them. The consumer is as eager to buy as the producer to sell, but the middleman keeps them far apart. It is he who regulates prices and in the frequent case of their going up the farmer derives no benefit whatever—the consumer simply pays more. The natural laws of supply and demand seem to have small part in regulating food prices.

There is a law in New York City which is being enforced very strictly and which results in a tremendous waste of good food. All the fruit and vegetables destined for our markets must be examined at the piers and terminals by representatives of the Board of Health. Before this work was undertaken (and only cities of the first class are attempting it to-day and not all of these are strictly enforcing it) everything could come in. Poor food was sold at low prices, and those who ate it did so at their own risk; now nothing comes in that is not examined and either passed or withheld. Food must be embargoed if a certain percentage is bad, and frequently the badness is due merely to injury in transportation. Sometimes 80 per cent of the food is perfectly good, yet with labor at fifty cents an hour it does not pay the commission merchants to have it looked over, and so the good is thrown away with the bad. Isn't there a question as to whether it is not better at times to let the 20 per cent bad food in, if there is no other way to save 80 per cent good food? After all a part of today's good food may be bad tomorrow and twice be sorted in the market.

The city laws require that no food shall be brought into New York which is "unsound," and one wonders how any food is considered sound when he contemplates the great chart hanging in the office of the Board of Health which shows all the various catastrophes that may occur to food, from happenings on the farm—"micro-organism infection," "excessive drought," "shortage of labor," "poor packing" (due to "unskilful labor," "rough handling," etc.), through the

various shipping troubles—"congestion of cars," "shortage of cars," "no refrigeration," etc., down to the consignee, who may decline it because it is "wholly unsound," "partly unsound and overhauling not profitable," "market conditions unfavorable," etc.

When the inspectors speak of food "as is" they mean that it is generally perfect with not more than a certain allowable percentage damaged. Oranges, grapefruit and lemons will pass if not more than nineteen per cent is damaged, berries twenty-four per cent, and vegetables fifteen per cent. When the percentage of damaged food is greater than the allowance, it can not pass "as is," but an embargo is put on it by the inspector, and it must be sorted before any of it is allowed to enter the city markets.

The commission merchants may refuse to accept an embargoed shipment of food, but if it will pay them to do so they can sort it. They may turn it back on the railroad and the railroad can sort it to earn the freight charge. Next are certain privileged men who take over the food that is embargoed and not otherwise disposed of, and they sort and sell to small dealers, the profit going to the railroads, the sellers receiving five per cent commission on their sales, the farmer getting nothing.

After this last attempt to get a sale for the good food, the remainder, good and bad, is ordered to the dump on Barren Island. There are no municipal store houses to which it can be sent, no municipal markets where it can be sorted and sold, and the dock and pier space must be cleared for the morrow's shipments. The only city space for sorting food, and this is known as "the City Farm," is the middle of the street.

The City Canning and Drying Kitchen, instituted by women of the Women's University Club and the Mayor's Committee of Women on National Defense, and of the Junior League, was established to salvage food that could not otherwise be disposed of. All of these are giving personal service. As may be imagined, the work was not undertaken without a thorough study of the conditions and the assurance by the Board of Health that a very large quantity of perfectly good food might still be saved.

The operation as conducted by the women of the City Kitchen is as follows: The work on the pier is in charge of one woman who, with the

consent of the Board of Health, the approval of the railroad officials and the nod of the dock superintendent, moves freely about among the commission merchants, waiting to salvage food that finds no buyer. The reasons for its failure to sell will be found in that Board of Health chart—"overhauling not profitable," "facilities to salvage unavailable," "market unfavorable," "labor too high," etc. The volunteer labor which the Kitchen is able to command makes it possible for the women to sort, with the aid of Boy Scouts, food which it would not pay a commission merchant to handle.

After all the possible purchasers finish their labors the salvage for the Kitchen begins, and word is sent by telephone to the plant as to what is coming. It may be potatoes or other fresh foods which need no canning, and these are sold at once at a little below the wholesale price, that price being sent in daily by the Board of Health. It may be pineapples or lemons or cabbages—thrown away by the verdict of a few traders. This good food, which costs nothing, is approved by the Board of Health and then transported to the City Kitchen under Williamsburg Bridge, where it is preserved for use next winter. Perishable food is plentiful now, but the lean months are coming, and the fruit and vegetables which are canned, salted down, preserved or dried will be welcome then to the rich as well as to the poor. It is not the intention of the workers, however, that much of it shall reach the rich.

Sterilized glass jars are ready, and the work begins at once when the food reaches the Kitchen. The cold-pack preserving method is used when possible, and twenty per cent more sterilization than the schedule demands is allowed. Nothing is rejected that is in good condition. Cabbages are turned into sauerkraut; vegetables are packed into kegs with salt. If there is little food value, a relish may be made that will take the place of butter, or act as an appetizer to an otherwise dull meal.

The filled jars are stored in the same building. The cost will be carefully calculated—glass jars, labor, transportation, ingredients, etc., added.

After the work cards are redeemed, the food will be sold direct to the public at cost.

The plant is a one-story public-school building which had already been equipped as a kitchen for preparing school lunches, but in the summer it is not needed for that purpose. It can turn out lunches for 27,000 children a day, and thirty-four public schools can be supplied from this central kitchen. It is, of course, city property, and there is no expense for rent. The truck too is loaned by the city and, after unloading at the kitchen such food as can be cared for in one day, it carries the remainder to many a grateful institution.

Fuel is paid for, and the paid labor in the Kitchen is at present limited to an organizer, two canning experts, a bookkeeper and five women for unskilled labor. There are from thirty to forty volunteer workers a day. Each volunteer receives a card marked off in squares representing an hour's work, and the worker's card is punched according to her hours of labor. She can obtain fresh food at cost as an equivalent of her work, or preserved food can be had next winter, the food to be stored by the Kitchen until wanted.

The volunteer labor is handled from an up-town office, largely by telephone, the woman in charge being in touch with clubs, settlements and similar organizations, and with individuals anxious to help. Many volunteer laborers are foreigners; these are encouraged to introduce their own methods of preserving foods and have contributed many valuable recipes.


At present the women are working in only a few of the one hundred and twenty-five terminals in the city, but the following are some of the recent daily reports of food salvaged by the City Canning Kitchen.

July 16

800 pounds of cabbage, 1500 pounds of cucumbers, 400 pounds of apricots, 200 pounds of vegetables (unclassified).

July 17

Out of 65 barrels (9650 pounds) of cucumbers, 4000 pounds were saved. Because of limited space the Kitchen had to refuse on that day 38 barrels of cucumbers.



July 18

1000 pounds of pineapples, 150 pounds of grapefruit, 1200 pounds of cabbage, 300 pounds of turnips, 5 barrels of beans.

Beginning on the 13th of July the Kitchen has been fortunate enough to salvage daily about 3,000 pounds of good potatoes, which are at once sold at one cent a pound to people who are the greatest sufferers from the present high prices.

The women fully realize that they are not solving any economic problem, for the matter of labor does not have to be considered except in a very small way, but what they are trying to do is to solve one of the problems of food conservation. Certainly they are saving food, which in these war times is a matter of great importance. They are giving an object lesson to those who will look and learn and do likewise. They are gaining a knowledge at first-hand of conditions at the food terminals of their own city, and they believe that if sufficient publicity can be given to these conditions there will be improvement. The questions of municipal buying and selling, of getting producer and consumer nearer together, are constantly before them. The farmer, after paying about twice as much for everything as he paid a year ago, must feel sure of a market. The woman on whom rests the responsibility of feeding the family must be sure that she buys food at as low a price as possible. Conditions that allow hundreds of tons to be thrown away daily must cease. One thing is certain; the 80 per cent of good food that is often thrown away with the 20 per cent of bad should be put on the New York markets, and this would reduce the price.

The day this is written thirty-three barrels of good squash have been transferred from the piers to the Canning Kitchen, which otherwise would have been destroyed. Someone will benefit by the saving of this waste, but it will not be the farmer who suffers a dead loss on his squash, or the consumer who gains no reduction in price from the over supply. Something is wrong with the distributing system.

MABEL H. KITTREDGE.

A Texas Pogrom

A NEW case arises for the Association of American University Professors, something so far removed from their academic queries on academic freedom, so arbitrary, so grotesque, so much opera bouffe, that it will be like considering the acts of the Sultan of Sulu in the celebrated piece of that name. At the University of Texas one dean has resigned, all the assistants have been

dropped, and seven professors dismissed—to use the local words for it—and a great promise is made for October against others, including the president. For a state university the place has been notably free from political entanglements. These began in the time of former President Mezes; but it has taken the elemental genius and naïveté of Governor Ferguson to bring things to the present chaos.

The psychology of the Governor seems beyond the power of his observers. But it is widely admitted that he is a man of simple but vehement directions, copious emotions, a headlong something that looks like courage at all times, a sense of almost brilliant abuse, and a use of question-begging epithets and transferred facts and reckless vivacity of statement, that are effective in mass oratory. Something out of all this—just what is not clear—started him on the problem of the university.

What irony is it that makes things express themselves typically, according to popular farce and melodrama and moving-picture? Here is the University of Texas, with a total of 4,620 students, a place of striking growth and development, of good standing, commended by President Eliot at the time of his tour of the colleges as among the leading state universities, here is such a place suddenly turning O. Henry, Bret Harte, comic supplement, and getting itself featured in such a rattling, roisterous fashion that all who hear of it will be saying: How western! Just like Texas. Which is not the case at all. And yet the seriousness of the situation, the threatened ruin, does almost disappear in the glaring farce of its incidental expression.

Governor Ferguson began the attack by assailing Dean Battle, then serving with marked success as acting-president, accusing him of many things: of the misuse of appropriations, of an attempt to overthrow the will of the people and free government, and of stripping the people of all but the privilege of shouldering and paying for a few men's "unholy spree of establishing an educational hierarchy," and so on. To which Dean Battle with the support of the Attorney General of Texas, replied with precision and dignity, and from which, fantastic as it was, he was exonerated by the Board of Regents. At the same time, seeing no chance of harmony, Dean Battle withdrew his name from any consideration for the presidency, and later accepted a position elsewhere. The Governor then indicated a number of men that ought to be removed from the faculty—a body dubbed by him as tin Jesuses—and implied that unless that was done there would "be the biggest bear fight that was ever pulled off in Texas." The professors were then called before the regents to defend them-

selves. The Governor himself saw no reason for such hearings; when asked by a regent for his reason for the dismissals, he replied: "I don't have to give reasons. I am Governor of Texas." One of the regents declared that he would rather go to hell in a hand-basket than dismiss one of the men. Sins were assigned them. One cheated the Auditor on mileage books; another presided at a meeting at which a question arose as to the endorsement of the Governor's policies. Another ought to be dismissed because anybody could see how—to use the Governor's words—"His School of Journalism had defied the Governor of Texas, who has given him the biggest appropriation they ever had." "He was the editor"—which was not the case, Mr. Mayes being only a stockholder—"of the paper that skinned me from hell to breakfast. He is drawing the state's pay to skin my back from one end of the state to the other. And then you gentlemen criticize me for doubting this appropriation and say I am putting the school into politics." One man's sin was a football game at the state's expense. And another had been selling notebooks to his students and making money thereby.

The Sulu, the bouffe, the Sultanic, appeared in the real objections to these men. These were varicolored, local, whimsical, passionate. The baldest was the notebook accusation, wholly disproved, which rested on a pious zeal with an unlucky climax when a vice crusade for the students' good ran suddenly near the ways of a regent, a benefactor of the University. The matter was beneficently silenced; but the regent insisted, quite impersonally, of course, that this professor should be dropped for hurting the business interests of the town by making public the presence of vice.

From all these charges the faculty members were all cleared and the matter closed by the Board of Regents.

But on July 12th, a Board of Regents, mainly new, remade for the purpose, met. One at least—more it is said—carried his six-shooter. But things were simple enough. The name of Professor Keasbey was put up for dismissal and passed (though this is a case outside of the rest, a matter of efforts contrary to the present purposes of the United States government); then six names were proposed for dismissal, and without argument or discussion, passed. More to follow in October. This was an easier method than the earlier trials, just a Governor's will.

And meantime the students on one occasion during a meeting of the Governor with the Board of Regents had formed a parade of 2,000 with music and banners bearing such legends as "Kaiserism is a Menace Abroad, Likewise at Home."

"While I was reading the sixth paragraph [of his order to the Regents]," says the Governor, "the sound of fife and drum was heard resounding in the corridors of the Capitol." And all due, he thinks, to faculty incitement and coöperation. Farmer Jim wants, as the Governor is called, he says, "to make a first class university, though men may wish to enjoin him" from exercising his constitutional right to appoint members of the faculty. Couldn't the people, he asks, get more good out of the 317 dollars a year spent on each student at the University by putting it into primary education? Some people are "hog wild over higher education," he says, "come to be damn fools about it." "All we are going to do is to restore the University to a business basis, get the dead men off the payroll, and have those people out there work eight or ten hours a day like the Governor and the judges and your other servants."

And, as a friend of his remarks, it can readily be seen that an institution that serves usually 2,500 out of five million people, yet costs a million dollars a year, is not a complete success; if the place were what it ought to be there should be for this sum 25,000 students.

Meanwhile there is a large class that sides with Farmer Jim; and there is an element that enjoys the whole affair as a mere political row, the ins and outs of favor and party. The friends of the University have rallied around it in a manner that will eventually be to its good. And practically all the best newspapers are on this side. Incidentally the Prohibitionists point out that at least five of the nine regents have anti connections; and also cite letters from Mr. Busch that were unearthed in the course of the Sulphur Springs trial in which Mr. Busch urges that they get more hold on the universities and put more men on the faculties who would appreciate the qualities of beer. And Mr. Hogg, of the Ex-Students' Committee and a former regent, begins a recent leaflet with this fine botanical figure: "To call this thimble-rigging, swaggering, swashbuckling Governor a common-garden liar would be the grossest flattery."

And the Association of American University Professors, what can it do about it? How will it approach the matter? Nobody is arguing about freedom of speech, delicate points of expression, class-room and platform ethics, or about thought or teaching. The whole discussion has not touched once upon brains or on scholarly equipment. The whole fight has been set up on the basis of a very low-class morality; and that mostly insincere, though recognized by the masses as the one indisputable way to catch the other fellow. Grafting, lying, cheating, easy traps. And suppose the Association of American University Professors did

get together in pungent shape its objections and injunctions? The Governor has answered that with the same autocracy over English that he claims over faculties.

In a letter to Mr. Faber: "It appears from recent developments that certain members of the Board of Regents are conspiring with certain members of the faculty, including the President of the University, to perpetuate certain members of the faculty who in my opinion, contrary to every principle of right and decency.

"It is quite apparent that the issue is going to be decidedly drawn. I am, therefore, writing you to say that unless I may be assured of your full and complete coöperation, I will much appreciate your sending to me at once your resignation as a member of the Board of Regents.

"You can rest assured that I have nothing against you personally, but the time has come when I must know who is for me and who is against me."

This from the faculty trials:

"We just as well understand each other and I will tell you now, if you undertake to put these men over me, I am going to exercise my constitutional authority"—which does not exist—"to remove every member of this board that undertakes to keep them. I say that in all due candor."

The Chairman asks if he wants to dismiss these men without investigating the charges. The Governor replies: "You can do as you please about it. It seems that I have to prove my case step by step, and it seems that the Governor of Texas is an orphan child and it seems that at the University he has to prove his case. I haven't got time to come out here and appear in the rôle of county attorney."

The Chairman then asks what suggestions of procedure the Governor has to make in regard to this matter.

"I think it is just as easy as falling off a log. If you simply go to these men—and they are guilty of the charge, there ain't two ways about it—if President Vinson will just simply go to these men: 'You made this record here and I am not to blame for it—I can't include your name in that list and I want to relieve this University of this issue.' And that is all there is to it. Everything will be harmonious and everything will come along all right. But whenever you get the idea in your head that you will make one of these teachers out here bigger than the Governor or the Legislature—it is just like a cash boy in Mr. Sanger's store trying to tell Mr. Sanger where to head in. You all can't expect me to keep my self-respect and put Battle over me.

". . . You are proceeding on the theory that these professors have got some legal right

here. They are tenants at will just like any man that is working for Mr. Sanger or in Major Littlefield's bank. For the good of his bank he can discharge and the discharging is done and does not call for anything further than they catch him with the goods on. . . . You have a perfect right to dispose of any man you want to without me. Tell him we have decided we don't need you and that's all there is to it. . . . For the good of this University say, now, go along: we wish you Godspeed; we are not going to put anything in your way; we are not going to prefer charges against you . . . for the good of the University this thing ought to be done. In that way you settle this thing. You will have no row; you will restore the confidence of the rest of the faculty. . . . A man has a right to a trial where you are going to hang somebody, but—. . . . As a legal proposition you are correct, but this Board is bound by no such decision. There may be lots of men in here that this Board may think are not proper people and they can dispense with their services without any trial."

One of the regents: "Only a few years ago the Board of Regents and the President gave a couple of members of the Medical Department fifteen minutes to send in their resignations."

Finally comes the announcement of a special session of the Legislature this month, to consider impeachment proceedings against the Governor.

And the Governor himself states in the press that a certain questioned act of his was "as square and as honest as any act of the Savior."

STARK YOUNG.

Robert Bridges and Thomas Hardy

ROBERT BRIDGES and Thomas Hardy—one may join them as the contrasting poets in English literature of to-day: the one writing clearly and fluently out of an understanding of the whole of the national cultivated poetry; the other hacking out forms to fit his very personal conceptions or else taking up the jigs and jangles of the country ballad-singer: the one deeply learned; the other curiously informed, oddly knowledgable: the one the poet of the court; the other the poet of the village community.

They both have added to the variety of English verse, and it is interesting to notice the kind of contribution each has made. As I look at a poem in Hardy's *Time's Laughing Stocks*, I recall how at a meeting of a poetry society in an American city I heard a lady criticize a poem that had

just been read. The poem was by way of being a bargewoman's utterance, and the lady's point was that the casual rhythms of vers libre would have been more appropriate to its dramatic character: A bargewoman, the lady suggested, is hardly likely to think in a form composed of regular rhythms and rhymes. I wondered what that lady would have said to Hardy's Trampwoman's Tragedy with its curious rhymes and refrains—

From Wynyard's Gap the livelong day,
The livelong day,
We beat a-foot the northward way
We had travelled times before.
The sunblaze burning on our backs,
Our shoulders sticking to our packs,
By fosseway, fields and turnpike tracks,
We skirted sad Sedge-moor.

Full twenty miles we jaunted on,
We jaunted on,—
My fancy-man, and jeering John,
And Mother Lee, and I.
We climbed the toilsome Poldon crest,
And saw, of landskip sights the best,
The inn that beamed thereby.

Has one to justify Hardy for making a trampwoman speak to such measure? If one has, one might say that emotional expression always transcends mere vocabulary, or rather that there is a vocabulary of the heart as well as a vocabulary of the head. And the heart has its own reserve of expression—measures of old songs, music, rare and noble words—if indeed those internal rhythms to which all rhythms in poetry are correspondences do not belong to it. It is the intuition of this that makes dramatic poetry at all possible and permits a trampwoman or a queen or a priestess to speak in verse. Hardy's trampwoman sets her tragic remembrances to a tune that many country songs have been set to. And is not this vagrant tune just as natural to the vagrant woman as any sentence out of the six or eight hundred words that philologists would allow her?

Aloof from the literary exchange Thomas Hardy makes verse-forms that are oddly his own. The form of the Trampwoman's Tragedy is a restoration. But the form of The Flirt's Tragedy seems to have been hacked out by the poet—

Here alone by the logs in my chamber,
Deserted, decrepit—
Spent flames limning ghosts on the wainscot
Of friends I once knew.

My drama and hers begins weirdly
Its dumb reënactment,
Each scene, sigh and circumstance passing
In spectral review.

—Wealth was mine beyond wish when I met her
The pride of the lowland—
Embowered in Tintinhull Valley
By laurel and yew;

And love lit my soul, notwithstanding
My features! ill-favor,
Too obvious beside her perfections
Of line and hue.

And so on, with one monotonous rhyme linking up its thirty stanzas. With its odd form it adds to the variety of English verse; each stanza seems a tour-de-force. Often one has the notion that some of Hardy's poems are in an ill-fitting form—that the emotion has not made the mould, but has been forced into a form that happened to be in Hardy's mind at the time. The Noble Lady's Tale in Time's Laughing Stocks might be given as an instance: here there seems to be a conflict between the letter and the spirit, for verse meant to give body to the lightest and most spontaneous emotion is forced to hold an analysis of dubious motives—

Did she, we wonder, follow
Jealously?
Was her denial hollow?
Or saw he
Some semblant dame? Or can wraiths really be?

Open a volume of Robert Bridges at any place and to this verse that seems weighted with effort one has the contrast—

Clear and gentle stream!
Known and loved so long,
That hast heard the song
And the idle dream
Of my boyish day;
While I once again
Down thy margin stray,
In the selfsame strain
Still my voice is spent,
With my old lament
And my idle dream,
Clear and gentle stream!

He can write with more thrilling lyricism, but he need never write with less ease and fluency. He makes lyrics, so perfectly to the melody that the Elizabethans had the secret of, that one is tempted to speak of him as a belated Elizabethan. Bridges has gone beyond the Elizabethans, however. The masques he writes are better than theirs, for they have been stripped of the Elizabethan fancifulness, and have been made all Greek and all lovely. His songs, such as *I Have Loved Flowers that Fade*, *Thou Didst Delight My Eyes*, *I Praise the Tender Flower*, *The Affliction of Richard*, are perfect where the Elizabethan songs were perfect—they add to the rarities of pure song. One is tempted to speak of him as an

Elizabethan and then one remembers that that is to suggest that with him English poetry has made no advance. That is not the case, for Robert Bridges has notably widened its scope and variety. I do not speak now of his experiments in classical prosody—of his English hexameters which, as he has owned, reveal an unexplored field of delicate and expressive rhythms hitherto unknown in our poetry. He has ventured to use quantity in his shorter poems, and his curiously rhythmized *Passer By*, *Nightingales*, *On a Dead Child*, represent a new conquest in verse.

When one notes the extent of Robert Bridges's work and its extraordinary excellence one wonders how it is he has had to wait so long for general recognition. Here is a poet that is the peer of Tennyson in his regard for what is noble and distinguished in English diction and rhythm. Perhaps it was because his excellence was so akin to Tennyson's (not the Tennyson of the albums, need one say?) that his recognition has been belated. The generation that saw the passing of Tennyson wanted the taste of the exotic and the wild. They came under the spell of Arthur Symonds and Yeats and Rudyard Kipling, and they were merely respectful to an achievement that was un-alien to the tradition of English poetry.

And now if one brings together the names of Robert Bridges and Thomas Hardy it is because they stand to-day as the two great masters of English literature. Each is a representative Englishman and each stands for a half of the national life. Bridges, the poet of culture and the poet of the court, is an Epicurean—an Epicurean of the time when the name covered a moral philosophy. Through an art which represents a life's dedication he shows us the gracious lines that are in life. And if Bridges is an Epicurean, Hardy is a Stoic—a disgruntled stoic one has to call him—

Ache deep; but make no moans:
Smile out; but stilly suffer:
The paths of love are rougher
Than thoroughfares of stones.

So he writes who has never written of love responsive—who, oddly—very oddly—became lyrical through expressing love denied and love frustrated. The iteration of what is mechanic and malign in the universe racks him. If another had not named it Hardy would surely have brought us to declare the Eternal Return. He gazes, not upon the flow, but upon the swirl of things. It is Bridges who can follow the flowing stream, and can sing—

One long in city pent
Forgets, or must complain:
But think not I can stain
My heaven with discontent;

Nor wallow with that sad
Backsliding herd, who cry
That Truth must make man bad,
And pleasure is a lie.

Rather while Reason lives
To mark me from the beast,
I'll teach her serve at least
To heal the wound she gives:
Nor need she strain her powers
Beyond a common flight,
To make the passing hours
Happy from morn till night.

Happy Epicurean! And what hope has Hardy in the Reason that Bridges would make serve him? Do you remember the impressive chorus in *The Dynasts*—the chorus in which the Pities make a last comment upon the agonies and futilities of the Napoleonic wars? In that chorus a dim hope is expressed that at last the Will whose representation is Nature will be informed by Reason—by that Consciousness that has come up as such an unaccountable by-product—and thus in some unglimped aeon the agonies and futilities will end. That Aeschylean solution shows at what a distance Hardy stands from the great artist who is now England's Laureate. PADRAIC COLUM.

CORRESPONDENCE

A Word from France

SIR: You have known a proud, even a happy emotion, no doubt. I have seen the reflection of it on American faces here; from their manifest pride and joy alone, one recognized their nationality. Tolstoi talks in *War and Peace* of "that joyous animation which shows itself at the beginning of all wars." We have known it, the Italians have known it, you have known it. It is a lightning flash that passes; and then one must arm oneself with a long patience, with the submission of the sick and the poor, who toil and hope.

You came in time; I believe that we are getting to that last quarter of an hour (it may drag on, but it is certainly the last stage) where the outcome of wars is decided. Last February a certain pessimism, a pessimism that to my thinking had a foundation, dominated our minds. Materially, we felt ourselves dependent on you for our supplies, for the iron of our shells, for the wheat of our bread—and would it please you to keep on giving us credit? From the military standpoint, we feared we could not do better than maintain a bloody balance. Morally, the Entente was embarrassed by Italian nationalism and Russian autocracy.

Materially, your intervention relieves us immensely. From the military side what we chiefly ask of you, I believe, is heavy artillery, with technical experts to maintain it. The labor which this weapon involves is of an altogether industrial order, carried on under fire. In a week, two hundred metallurgists, ten foremen, and three engineers, are transformed into a gun crew. You will no doubt send us a few divisions; you will send them chiefly from a sentiment of national honor, and in this mêlée, where

men are counted by hundred thousands, their usefulness will be less military than moral; but this last is immensely important. Morally you help us immensely. You give back to our war the spiritual and half revolutionary meaning which it had in its very early days. This meaning had become impaired for many reasons, one of which I mentioned just now; there are others, notably this: that in France, especially, the élite is far from being revolutionary, and drops the formulas that it does not like.

And yet, if we want to live as a people, if we want to be saved from German slavery, we must lean upon revolutionary forces; only they can confirm our military effort, and shake from inside this German Empire whose growth means our suffocation. From this standpoint, the Russian Revolution, in spite of its anarchy, is a precious assistance—a great force joined to a great weakness. Your intervention is itself a revolution, but without anarchy; a great moral force joined to a great material force. I admit that I feared enslavement. Now I no longer fear it. If I still feared it I should not say so. I fear many things, but I no longer fear the essential. I believe, I hope, that thanks to you, we shall be able to hold out long enough to bring Germany to a state of distress and convulsion; after that an unknown future. But how good the unknown is, when one has had serious reason to fear a future moulded by Prussian autocracy! Then, again, on the threshold of this future, your authority, your influence can be immense. With the aid of your federalist experiences, we shall perhaps be able—perhaps . . . —to make our mad European nationalists understand that “the right of nationalities” is not an absolute; that above the nationalities there is the society of nations; and that if they wish to use their victory to intrigue against one another, all Europe, in spite of its past, will become the Balkans of the world. But we have not yet reached that stage. We are at the stage of resistance, of shock, and there are signs that the German Empire is beginning to feel the shock. We have long months still ahead of us, and much wreck and ruin will be inevitable.

“Joyous animation” is far from us. But patience holds out, and hope is revived.

X.

Paris, May 25th, 1917.

Defends the Rich

SIR: The New Republic published, on June 30th last, an article by Mr. Alvin Johnson containing two fallacies so serious from the point of view of your journal itself that you ought to disavow and deny them.

Mr. Johnson plans to cast exclusively upon the rich the duty to pay war taxes. But this is also the privilege of making pecuniary sacrifice for the war. Is it not the right of all that sacrifice of that sort should be universal? Is it not an undemocratic fallacy to confine it to the rich? And when Mr. Johnson and his like have abolished the rich, who will pay for wars? Those who are not rich ought to rise up and assert their right to have the burden cast on all.

A fallacy even more serious is Mr. Johnson's assumption that something substantial could be accomplished by planting war taxes on the rich alone. The only statesman who has really considered this subject is Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes (Cosmopolitan Magazine, Volume XL, Page 397). In a much neglected article of extraordinary pith and value he there points out the bad logic which is involved in assuming that income and consumption are

identical. Unless they are, Mr. Johnson's scheme must be entirely recast. And they are not, for as Holmes makes clear, it is only luxurious consumption or outgo which can be diverted from the rich to war or to the poor. Between great incomes and great outgo for luxury alone there is a jump which ought to break the neck of such ambitious and vaulting minds as that of Mr. Johnson. Unfortunately the quantity of this error cannot be measured by any existing statistics but it is measured by the considered opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes, who believes that not one per cent of the income of the nation is consumed in the wasteful luxuries of the rich. The general philosophy underlying his views has recently been supported by the sagacious Mr. Vanderlip. But I put it to The New Republic upon the sole authority of the former. Here is a very Mentor upon whom it is our use to rely. How can you or Mr. Johnson contest his conclusions?

RICHARD W. HALE.

Boston, Mass.

Does Not Accept Industrialism

SIR: I cannot accept M. Hamp's thesis, presented by Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant in a recent article, France and the Workman, that “to remain a great nation, France must become an industrial nation of the modern sort.” I do not agree that labor has been restored by the war to its rightful place; nor that “the era of automatic work . . . may become not the curse but the liberation of the workingman.” The hope that “France of to-morrow may be a better place to live in than the France of yesterday” springs from the idea that the workingman, gaining leisure through intensive industrial processes, will make his leisure creative.

Labor accepted the purposes for which this war is waged; its total energy was directed toward accomplishment expressed in national terms; an idealization of industrial processes resulted, for they furnish the sinews of modern war. It does not follow that these processes, therefore, even approximate a worthy ideal; nor that labor will feel the same impulse after the immediate purpose has been accomplished.

The war has given emphasis to and intensified certain characteristic tendencies of the present; and simple, mechanical tasks have become endowed with a spiritual significance; but it is a fallacy to assume that merely national industrial supremacy, or any similar remote ideal of peace, will be sufficiently vivid to cause labor to follow blindly the path marked out by intensive industrialism. One may with reason speculate upon what part the old industrial order of France contributed toward the wonderful showing of France at war; and also upon what might have been the showing had France already reached that state of intensive industrial development which is the hope of M. Hamp. Would such a France have furnished a sufficiently vivid ideal to warrant the sacrifice?

What is the ultimate gain in that social program which stamps out the creative impulse in work and advances merely the hope that it will find its complete expression in leisure? By separating life into thoughtless motions and recreation we erect a Chinese wall about our concept of education and deny the ideals of democracy. The hope of France, the hope of nations, is to be found, not through intensified automatic production by thoughtless operations, but through making work the process of creative endeavor.

FREDERICK ACKERMAN.

New York City.

For a People's House

SIR: May I call the attention of your readers to the concrete service which will be rendered by the People's House to its several thousand members. This institution, which is to be opened before the first of the coming year in the newly purchased building at 7 East Fifteenth Street, is modeled after the famous Maison du Peuple of Brussels. Among its departments there will be a coöperative restaurant where good food will be served at the lowest possible prices; a clinic which will supply all ordinary medical and dental services to its members at a yearly fee not exceeding \$1.50; a free gymnasium; a large library of books and periodicals on social and industrial subjects; and an auditorium seating 600 to be let at a small rental to labor unions and similar organizations, in addition to the free lectures and other services of the Rand School of Social Science, which will occupy the larger portion of the building. A Music and Drama Association has been organized to give plays and concerts at small cost. The building will provide offices for a number of labor unions, and a center for union activities. The coöperative work of the People's House will inevitably be extended from year to year. American labor unions have hitherto lagged behind those of other countries in such coöperative work, which has proved invaluable, not only as a concrete economic service to workingmen and women, but particularly as a training in administration and self-government.

The Commonwealth Hall Association, in charge of the organization of the People's House, needs \$30,000 by September first, with which to complete the purchase of the new building, and urgently requests contributions. These may be made either by donations or by the purchase of 4 per cent bonds secured by the property. Contributions should be sent to Bertha H. Mailly, 140 East Nineteenth Street, New York City.

BERTHA H. MAILLY.

New York City.

The Memphis Lynching

SIR: I am sure that you will be glad to learn that you are in error in suggesting that there was "no real proof whatever" of the guilt of Ell Person, who was lynched ten miles from Memphis some weeks ago.

Mr. Hunter Wilson, the county prosecuting officer, known with us as Attorney-General, informs me that there can be no question of the guilt of Ell Person, that he not only confessed to the officers here, but also to those in Nashville, in whose charge he was left when the Sheriff took him to the penitentiary to protect him from the mob. The criminal accompanied our officers to the place where the crime was committed and pointed to a pool of water in which he told them he had thrown the ax after committing the murder. It was ten feet deep and full of muddy water. A negro swimmer was employed who dived; and, after examining the bottom for some time, found the ax and brought it to the surface. There were other facts such as the finding of his blood-spattered shoes at the place where he said he had had them, which I need not go into. Such a confession, when confirmed by facts such as these, would be considered adequate evidence of guilt in any court in Christendom.

It must also be said for the mob, that when he was about to be lynched he implicated two other negroes who were promptly apprehended and cross-questioned, but, having

satisfied the leaders of their innocence, were released. The incident was horrible enough without the suggestion that an innocent man was the victim, and I hope you will do this community such justice as may result from the printing of this correction.

Perhaps the race question is the world problem most difficult of solution—which will threaten the peace of the world even after all others are eliminated. If we consider the South a laboratory where a solution may be sought, we can realize the importance of intelligent treatment—and yet our policy is one of drift—pure and simple.

The South looks askance on Negro improvement because she is afraid it will promote the amalgamation of the two races. But for this apprehension the same spirit which in a former generation produced the northern abolitionist would now bring forth a greater number of southern men seriously interested in the welfare of the Negro. In justification of her apprehension, the South points to the fact that wherever a lower and a higher race have lived in the same territory they have become completely blended. But this mixing has occurred outside of the marriage tie and this suggests that the path of safety may be found through the spread of education and morality—rather than in the direction of oppression and lynch law.

Again, if "we have beasts in human shape amongst us," to quote one of our papers—the question may be asked, "Whose fault is it?" If they are crazed with liquor or cocaine, it will be found these were sold by a white man. If the beastliness is ineradicable the place for such a person is in a colony for defectives such as that at Vineland, N. J. In most cases the right sort of education for useful life will prove an all-sufficient remedy. I have never heard of a case of rape by a Negro possessing any education at all. It is in the darkness of a mind deprived of any participation in the life and hope of the world that such thoughts are born and matured. But a people who lynch Negroes are not likely to provide for them improved education—so that, in effect, the two methods for lessening Negro crime cannot be used simultaneously.

Senator Leroy Percy, a prominent lawyer of Greenville, Mississippi, formerly United States Senator, declared at a meeting of the Mississippi Bar Association some years ago, that the Negro must be educated to be able to scrutinize his own accounts and thus lessen the temptation to dishonesty of those who deal with him. He spoke not so much in the interest of the Negro as because the maintenance of the integrity of the white man required it.

I am not a native of the South but I have lived here for thirty-five years and I know and love the southern people. They are an honest people, and if they can be brought to realize that lynching, by degrading and brutalizing the Negro, not only tends to accomplish just the reverse of the purpose they have in mind, but also makes him an easier prey for dishonest exploitation, they will set their faces against it like flint. But how is this knowledge to reach them?

Fortunately, perhaps, for all of us, the emigration of the Negroes to the North bids fair to reach such proportions that magazines published in the North may soon open their pages to the discussion of the race question even when not moved thereto by a lynching. We cannot save the world for democracy unless we show our faith in justice at home. If we do not establish justice where we have the power to do so how can we expect others to believe our promises as to matters not yet in our control?

BOLTON SMITH.

Memphis, Tennessee.

Books and Things

TEN years ago I was a prudent man. Before going away on a Friday I always called up my favorite Western Union office and made the usual arrangement. All I gave them was my address, Gordon Shriggs, care of so-and-so, such a place. The rest I left to the trustworthy Western Union young woman. She was not very inventive, but she never failed me. On Saturday morning I could depend on getting an urgent message calling me back to town. You know the sort of message I mean—"Uncle James failing rapidly earnestly desires your presence at bedside"—"Jenkinson short accounts meet him Saturday dinner and prevent exposure"—"One twin born other expected immediately Mabel crying for you." By Saturday morning, you see, I had had time to look over my hostess's house party and size it up. When it made a poor appearance I flashed my telegram on her and caught the next train to the city. When the other guests were up to my standard I ignored the telegram and sat tight. The plan worked smoothly enough, but as I got better acquainted with my hostesses and hosts, crossed more and more impossibles off my list, stuck more and more to the wholly dependables, the occasions demanding such precautions grew fewer and fewer. And so it happened, two weeks ago, that I started for Mrs. Wramper's, as I had started for many other places in recent years, unafraid and unprovided with a life-line of retreat.

I had met Mrs. Wramper only three or four times, but at our very first meeting I couldn't help noticing that I was making a favorable impression. Due to my bright talk, most likely. Anyway, when her invitation came my main feeling was surprise that it hadn't come before. I was perfectly unsuspecting. Even when I had a chance to see everybody, at tea on Friday, I didn't take the thing in. That is the difference, the terrible difference, between now and ten years ago. Then you could nearly always spot a highbrow, male or female, on sight. They were almost as easily identified as stage detectives or stage seducers or real life parsons. Nowadays anybody may turn out to be a highbrow—the girl you've been dancing with or the rare woman who plays a sound game of bridge. Why, I've even known a man who belongs to my club, who keeps five hunters in his stable, who is rich enough to spend his time as he pleases and who not only surrounds himself with highbrows but actually is one. These things I ought to have kept in mind when I had my first view of Mrs. Wramper's guests, but I didn't. They looked all right—mostly youngish, out-of-door men and women, nothing in the way of earnestness that you could take offense at, knowing how to wear their clothes. Only one of them looked like a total loss—an oldish bald enormously stout person—Harber, Mrs. Wramper told me his name was, and asked me what I thought of him. "Well," I said, remembering how she liked my brand of talk, "well, I fear we must prepare for the worst. His physicians say he will be fatter before he is thinner. He is a very fat man." She did not seem to hear. Sometimes I am afraid Mrs. Wramper is losing her sense of humor.

At dinner all went harmlessly enough until about the fish. Then that indecently obese old Harber pounded on the table, and invited the company to throw off its disguise and run up the black flag. Nobody looked indignant or even astonished. Everybody seemed to know, except me of course, what they were there for. Old Harber told them they had met, at Mrs. Wramper's invitation, to consider the possibility of entering into closer relations

with, of getting, if he might use the expression, into touch with, those who, in all countries, even in these times of war, or might he say especially in these times of war and social upheaval, those who, in short, were convinced of the primary necessity of awakening and keeping alive that one intellectual interest which was the root of all other intellectual interests, namely the interest in consecutive thought. The interest in, to put it even more exactly, sustained ratiocination. He called upon Miss Weed, who would skim, he said, for our benefit, the cream off the immediate situation in its religious aspect. Miss Weed, a rather neat affair of muscles and bones, was not slow to oblige the company by doing this. I can't remember her words, which didn't mean anything at all, except the comparatively few she used to say that the time had passed for speaking of the Kingdom of God, and that the time had come for saying the Democracy of God, as for example in this sentence: "The Democracy of God is within you." The still viable members of the family of old religious and ethical truths need to be rephrased, to be restated, if she might say so, to be translated out of the terms of the past into terms of the present, pragmatically.

"The cream of the religious situation," I whispered to my neighbor when the speaker had finished, "is that what you call cream?" She gave me a feline look and said, "I like it." "Cats do," I answered before I had time to think, and that seemed to close our conversation. After Miss Weed came a man who said education, when viewed in its larger aspects, appeared to be proceeding, but not progressing, by leaps and bounds toward the parting of the ways, of which one led to culture and the other to vocational service. What was needed was to synthesize these two ways, the vocational and the cultural, and to prove to all travelers that unless they walked with one foot in each they could not hope to reach the promised land. After another speaker, a man, had reduced art to its cloudiest and dustiest terms, the discussion was closed by a Mrs. Dopple or Dupple, or something. She did fifteen or twenty minutes about the uplifting effect of a mother's consecutive thought upon all departments of prenatal existence. She urged women upon whom the mantle of maternity was about to fall, meaning, I suppose, women who were already wearing what the advertisements call maternity garments, she urged them to ratiocinate sustainably for six hours a day. By this process, continued from generation to generation for a few hundred years, a race of thinkers would some day reach fruitful fruition.

Dinner ended in a unanimous resolution in favor of forming an association for the accomplishment of pretty much every aim that anybody had mentioned since the soup. The only thing in doubt was what to call such an association. Various names, all awfully poor, were suggested. I saw that the time had come for me to speak. Perfectly sober, perfectly good natured, I rose and said that the name of the society should suggest something I had remarked as common to all the speeches we had had the privilege of hearing, something which unified all the various approaches to the various subjects, something which made all the proposed quests sound curiously alike. "Ladies and gentlemen," said I, "we must call our society the Jargonauts."

You may not believe me, but next morning, when I rang for breakfast, the man brought me a telegram: "Uncle James at death's door and clamors for your company." Now, who do you suppose sent me that? Is it possible that I got talking at dinner, and gave myself away?

P. L.

Producing Plays and Confusion

Play Production in America, by Arthur Edwin Krows. New York: Henry Holt and Company. \$2.25.

MR. KROWS'S book is a very peek-a-boo of American stageland. In tracing the metamorphosis of a play from the manuscript to the storehouse, it tells all the secrets that you and I have always longed to know. Here you learn how the Hippodrome tank works; how stage managers entice additional curtain calls from an unwilling audience; how many pounds of breakfast food went to make the sandstorm in *The Garden of Allah*; and how you can get your tickets at cut rates. You are informed that Oliver Morosco's father was an acrobat and what Charles Frohman permitted Maude Adams to do after she had completed her third year in *The Little Minister*. You learn about teasers and tormentors, flies and flippers, strips and slides, bunches and borders, drops and deadheads. Nearly everything, it seems, that can be told about the theatre business in detail is here, and you get an impression of an immense number of excited people doing an immense number of rather ridiculous things for the entertainment of a fat and sleepy public that doesn't know what it wants.

It is hardly the fault of the compendious author that he has not been able to supply a balanced and critical estimate of American methods of production. It takes space to explain why tormentors torment, and how clergymen may be used for advertising purposes when sex plays are in fashion. Besides, nobody else has done this particular job, while plenty of books are published annually on the need for art in the theatre. Few who have worked inside the American theatre for years, as Mr. Krows has, are able to get much perspective on their work, and it would be too much to ask the author to do two things well at the same time. But there is plenty of evidence that some highly significant implication is intended. In fact, the author admits that while the book is essentially American it is presented mainly to remark America's contribution to international development. The title page bears this quotation, by no less an authority than John Philip Sousa:

"It is not inapropos to remark that Europe gave us the tallow candle; but, like grateful children, we sent in return the electric light; Europe gave us the primitive hand-power printing-press of Gutenberg, and, in our simple-hearted way, we gave her the Goss perfecting press; Europe placed the goose-quill in our hands, and we have added the typewriter to her resources; Europe put the bare needle in the fingers of our housewives, and we reciprocate with the modern sewing-machine—but why enumerate?"

One American contribution to international development is mentioned explicitly—the lash line. Or, for further illustration, the author tells of the amusing experience which J. Harry Benrimo enjoyed while he was inspecting the Moscow Art Theatre. He discovered that some of the machinery bore the name of the Otis Elevator Company. "The incident," continues the author, "was doubly funny, because enthusiastic persons connected with this undeniably great Russian institution have taken pains to impress all who came that way with the idea that this playhouse has taken precedence over all in Europe." Further mention of American contributions to international development is omitted, but the reader may easily enumerate them. Several American plays, including *Baby Mine* and *Within the Law*, have had successful runs in Paris, and one, *The*

Great Divide, has nobly failed. America has likewise contributed some hundreds of thousand francs in royalties to the Société des Auteurs Dramatiques and at least two or three actresses to the English nobility. Besides, it can be hazarded that Europe, in all probability, has no pair of comedians equal to the late team of Montgomery and Stone, and nothing exactly like the plays of Mr. George M. Cohan.

Yet there is much that continental Europe can learn from America. The Moscow Art Theatre, which keeps apprentices studying two years before permitting them to join its company, might study how the American theatre picks up its actors without the slightest trouble from agencies and rehearses them six weeks without pay, usually to turn them out on the street, in two or three weeks more. It might examine that remarkable memorandum by which the American manager orders of his scenery mechanic "one fancy interior, magnate's residence, entrances left centre and back," etc. Particularly it might learn from the American manager how to whip a show into shape two weeks ahead of time in order to replace an unexpected flivver in a house that would otherwise be dark.

All these things the foreign visitor would need to study at first hand, not from this book. For Mr. Krows tells of them in such detail that all perspective is lost. He is inclined to be complacent about American muddling, when he is not openly proud of it. Even ticket speculation he calls a "necessary evil," instead of an infernal, unnecessary nuisance. With such tireless faithfulness does he explain how plays get produced in America that the reader is inclined to exclaim: "Well how on earth *do* they ever get produced!"

The reader must supply the picture as best he may. Translating the whole devious process, he finds that it comes to something like this: The play is written by someone called an author, and "placed" by a broker with a manager. It is then "doctored" by a professional hack and "laid out" by a hired director who further doctors it to "accomplish work properly belonging to the play doctor or to the author." Next it is "cast" with such actors as happen to be out of a job at the moment, and rehearsed to machine-like regularity, literally by means of a chalk-line. In the meantime some "scenic studio" is building sets according to rigid specifications—to wit, that there shall be so-and-so many doors, practicable or otherwise, so-and-so many pieces of furniture in such-and-such locations. At the appointed day play and scenery are for the first time brought into juxtaposition, lights are turned on, gowns hastily pinned together, and all parts adjusted to each other as well as may be. Next the assemblage is moved out of town to be tried on "the dogs"—New Haven, Albany and Atlantic City papers please copy. The dogs delight to bark and bite, and the manager usually steps in to do more doctoring. Finally the play with all paraphernalia thereunto appertaining is moved back to New York, in such theatre as happens at the time to be vacant, and the first night impends. A host of petty bosses and officious underlings assist in the process, and the net result is that in two cases out of three the play fails utterly. Production is several times in excess of the demand, and the losses are paid out of the absurd profits from occasional "successes."

However, do not blame this on the system, for the system is as expert and infallible as American ingenuity can make it. It boasts a division of labor which is truly an American contribution to international development. The gentlemen who write the play are expert because they have written the same play many times before. The producer

likewise has many times produced the same play in the same way. The scene-maker also has made the same setting, and the actor has acted the same "type"—many, many times. The American theatre has spared no pains or expense to secure the best in each department. Could the total result be aught but expert? Imagine how superlative a landscape could be painted if the trees were done by a tree expert, the water by a water expert, the clouds by a cloud expert, and so on to the last detail. Yet such a picture, if the Metropolitan Museum were fortunate enough to house it, would only partially suggest the extraordinary expertness of the American theatre. True, the trees, water and clouds might not agree in the picture, but the various experts could discuss such details after their several contributions were finished.

With the first night come the advertisements, the free press stories, paid for on another ledger, and the critics. My compliments to the critics, an honest and able crew, and may they some day have a job worthy of their powers. At present, though some of them have complete freedom of opinion, they receive their salaries in effect from the advertising department and not, as you had supposed, from the city editor's pay roll. Their function, whether they know it or not, is to keep the advertising pot boiling, not to report a part of the artistic life of the town. About ten per cent of the money received by New York theatres is expended on advertising. In other words, you spend twenty cents, each time you go to a theatre, to persuade yourself to see the show. As for the press agents, they are relatively useless and harmless.

The play is having its first night. It is the second entr'acte; the critics are disagreeing in the lobby and the manager is sitting in the last row wondering if he will lose the \$5,000 to \$10,000 which he spent on the piece before the curtain rose. But at this very time a strange and significant thing is happening. A group of gentlemen on the sidewalk, in no way connected with the theatre, are determining the price of admission. Do not ask why they have forgotten to look at the legend over the box-office: "Seats 50 cents to \$2.00." That does not tell the price, but merely the par value of the play. The actual price is determined by the group of gentlemen on the sidewalk, in exact ratio to the reputed success of the play. If the verdict is "success," then these gentlemen extract from the box-office some scores of the best tickets for some scores of future performances, to distribute them among hotels and little holes-in-the-wall along Broadway and 42d Street. Here the seats—all the desirable ones in the house—are sold for \$2.50, \$5.00 or even \$10.00 apiece. On the other hand, if the play drops below par, there is a certain eminent person, one Joe Leblang, here nominated for the Hall of Fame, who will sell you seats at half price or less. After all, why deal with the box office at all? If the play is a success you will be turned away; if it is a "flivver" you will pay double the market price. Winthrop Ames, as Mr. Krows relates, once thought of a splendid scheme for suppressing the illegalities of ticket speculation, only unfortunately it was illegal. Mr. Krows lays the whole blame at the feet of what is technically known to the profession as the damn fool public. But the fact remains that the managers could abolish ticket speculation, from which they derive little or no profit, in twenty-four hours. The one small convenience the speculator affords to the public—that of running accounts—could be offered without the slightest difficulty by an association of managers.

Enough of this tiresome tale of play production in America. The reader, after finishing Mr. Krows's book,

will hardly fail to conclude that this clumsy business is one of the least of America's contributions to international development. As an art it is not comparable with the English, French, German or Russian. As a business it is wasteful, slipshod, unwieldy, and supremely scornful of the consumer. The foreign theatre which has developed each process in the business under a single directing intelligence, and has made itself an indispensable part of the life and thought of its community, will hardly sit at our feet in these matters, however many machines it may purchase from the Otis Elevator Company. The only cause for admiration is the amount of free and vigorous endeavor which somehow manages to survive in this hamstrung system. Actors, producers, designers, managers, are doing admirable things individually, but whenever they move a free arm they are caught in the cogs of the machine. We thank Mr. Krows for having industriously described its creaking wheels, but we resent this patriotic complacency with our national muddling.

HIRAM KELLY MODERWELL.

Germany's "Public Opinion"

The Land of Deepening Shadow, Germany at the Third Year of War. By D. Thomas Curtin. New York: George H. Doran Co. \$1.50.

THERE was no need for Mr. Curtin to dedicate his volume to Lord Northcliffe to show that he meant his book to be a crushing indictment of the German autocracy. Certainly he pursued an exceedingly clever method for achieving his purpose. Under the disguise of a seemingly frank and dispassionate analysis of conditions, the facts are carefully selected and presented with true journalistic cunning in contrast and climax. One hesitates to term this technique dishonest even in a minor sense, for the chances are that it results more from an unconscious bias than from any deliberate attempt to deceive. Furthermore, the main outlines of the picture Mr. Curtin draws tally with what has been told us over and over again by observers whose veracity cannot be questioned. In his prophecies, too, Mr. Curtin showed remarkable shrewdness. Speaking of the chances of Germany beginning her "ruthless" submarine warfare, Mr. Curtin says: "As I write (January 21st, 1917) I am convinced that it is only a question of time until Germany is reduced to this last desperate resort." That prophecy was fulfilled within two weeks. One can only hope that his hints of a German revolution following disillusion and useless suffering may prove to be equally well founded.

The picture Mr. Curtin would present is of a small and unscrupulous autocracy gulling an intelligent and disciplined but none too idealistic people by appealing alternately to their pride and greed and fear. With a few minor reservations this picture may be accepted as fairly near the truth. But what the *Land of Deepening Shadow* really furnishes is more an impressive exposition of the power and massiveness and sources of public opinion. To be sure, when Mr. Curtin was talking to a foreign official apropos of a certain proposal and naively inquired if public opinion would sanction such a step, the official replied in a shocked tone: "Public opinion? Why, we create public opinion." That is just it. Mr. Curtin's book is an illuminating if somewhat disconcerting exposition of the process by which public opinion is created in Germany. It is mobilized and controlled. It flows always

in the direction those in power in Wilhelmstrasse intend it to flow. The universities are mobilized; the press, the pulpit. Only recently have the mutterings of a suppressed opposition been allowed to become articulate. Although our radicals complain in loud tones that we are rapidly becoming "Prussianized" they would have to confess in honesty, after a reading of Mr. Curtin's book, that America still is, comparatively speaking, the home of the free. We have not yet adopted the most effective plan for crushing opposition, "preventive" arrest. Nor do anti-war meetings have to take place in cellars as they have to in Bohemia, for all Austria's proud boasting of the loyalty of her Czechs. Never has the value of a mistaken minority or a perverse opposition seemed so high as when one surveys the picture of a hungry, embittered and suspicious Germany "going through victory after victory to defeat."

The whole force of Mr. Curtin's book comes from making vivid the truth of the Chancellor's utterance in the Reichstag when he said, apropos of the complete blockade of Great Britain by submarines, "We are staking all on this throw." If the submarine war fails and Germany's food supply becomes lower—as every evidence furnished by Mr. Curtin goes to prove—then even the Berlin control of public opinion in Germany will be shaken. Austria-Hungary cannot be kept in line, even if the credulity of the German people exceeds the high estimate of Mr. Curtin. The author himself intimates as much, although for propaganda purposes he has to exaggerate the hatred of Germany for her enemies and the blind refusal to liberalize either her war aims or her own institutions. Mr. Curtin dwells lovingly on the songs of hate taught children ten and eleven years old. This, however, is mere malice. Probably Mr. Curtin himself knows as well as Herr Scheidemann that if the Allies offered liberal terms to Germany, and Prussia refused, "there would be a revolution in Germany."

"Freedom of Contract"

A Seasonal Industry: A Study of The Millinery Trade in New York, by Mary Van Kleeck. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. \$1.50.

TO win any kind of factual order from the exploitation jungles of one of the world's worst seasonal industries—the disorganized and chaotic millinery trade—would be disheartening to any investigator with anything less than the indomitable patience possessed by Miss Van Kleeck. Her exhaustive survey of enough facts to justify valid general conclusions becomes almost meticulous in its conscientiousness. Comparative tables and charts and median curves, all the technical instruments of the newer and more scientific method of sociological investigation, abound. They were not easy to compile. Even when they possessed complete wages sheets—which they seldom did—the employers were often suspicious and hostile. Employees, on the other hand, were afraid that the investigators might be spies, and it was hard to win their confidence. The casualness of the trade itself was, of course, the chief ugly difficulty. But in the end Miss Van Kleeck succeeded, and the main outlines of the condition in the trade emerge with sharp enough emphasis to give the general reader a correct orientation. And for the special student there are the intricate and innumerable details.

Miss Van Kleeck does not herself pretend to be illuminating. No attempt is made, for instance, to speculate on

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the relation between the parasitic woman of modern civilization and the cruel exploitation of those who struggle so desperately to support life by gratifying her whims of fashion, although such speculation might lead to fruitful insights concerning the inevitable degradation of industry which follows any degradation of woman. Miss Van Kleeck admits that this and similar speculation is "tempting," but it is not a temptation to which she succumbs. She faithfully sticks to her chief purpose of exposition.

The conclusion resulting from the investigation of thousands of cases was simply that the average wage was far below any decent living wage. Even allowing for the fact that many girls lived at home and therefore engaged more or less in a coöperative family budget, any honest analysis of the factors of drain upon income in the usual worker's household, with its dependents and sick, would prove irresistibly how small were the chances of making ends meet. Seasonal variations, of course, are extreme. There is little stability in the "wholesale" business as contrasted with the "retail" business. Both types of millinery industry are constantly overlapping. One season the demand will be for standard "machine pressed" shapes for hats; another, for individual and gay designs. The worker's home itself may become a semi-private venture in production, competing with the factory next door. The employees seldom are long in a single shop; constant shifting of the places of employment is the rule. If the girl is not satisfied with one shop, she can, and frequently does, try her luck in a second or third. Furthermore, differences in language and training among the girls militate against the kind of solidarity of labor and class spirit which is possible even in such an industrial laissez-faire desert as the

cloak and suit trade. As one experienced woman said, "You might as well try to organize the wind as the millinery trade." Unionism is impossible under such conditions. What is more, the employers themselves are almost as far from any effective coöperative organization as are the women they hire. Their exploitation, in other words, is even worse than that of deliberate selfishness—it is that of irresponsibility, like the trade itself. Most employers regard the whole millinery industry as just a gamble. It is merely a more exacting and exciting form of speculation than the Stock Exchange.

Thus the salient need of the millinery trade—from both the employers' and employees' side—is for some sort of public or social control. Miss Van Kleeck advocates the minimum wage, and believes that an alert and intelligent minimum wage board could recommend methods to employers that would certainly help in stabilizing the business. At first, such recommendations might be expected to be followed voluntarily under the whip of "an enlightened public opinion"—perhaps an over-generous assumption—but voluntary coöperation and publicity failing, compulsion might be then exercised. Certainly from the workers' point of view the experience of Victoria, Australia, in a minimum wage law should banish the conventional fear that the minimum wage tends to become the maximum. Such was certainly not the case there, and Miss Van Kleeck justifiably questions its inevitability even in New York. An "enlightened public opinion" would further advocate, for example, the purchasing of hats in the dull season against the impending new efflorescence of novel styles in the spring or fall, thus stabilizing the industry. In a hundred ways, the instrument of public control, if backed by public opinion, would keep the balance wheel of the industry in place. Miss Van Kleeck carefully discusses all these methods. It is a real labor of love, the kind that is always distasteful to the easy theorizer. A Seasonal Industry is a piece of first-class investigation and analysis. But even Miss Van Kleeck has finally to rely, both for the legalizing of her recommendations and their enforcement after they have been legalized, upon our volatile but all-powerful public opinion. In peace times we could perhaps be optimistic enough to trust in its effectiveness. In time of war we can only pray that it be not diverted or made flabby through preoccupation with the tasks of destruction.

H. S.

Russian Revolution

The Russian Revolution, by Isaac Don Levine. New York: Harper & Bros. \$1.00.

THE Crimean war brought the liberation of the Serfs; the Russo-Japanese war brought the Duma; the great war brought the revolution. Many a future bird's-eye view historian will make that generalization from the recorded inefficiency and corruption of the Russian autocracy each time its fitness was tested in the furnace of national peril. Although he has leavened the mere literal record with competent and sometimes illuminating interpretation, Mr. Levine does not attempt to give more than a hasty journalistic summary. Yet even in so slight a book the author is compelled to devote over two-thirds his space to an analysis of the governmental disorganization, chicanery and almost open treason which made the drama of March, 1917, inevitable. It was not that the Conservative and

even Reactionary members of the Duma loved the Russian democracy more, but they loved the thought of German victory less. It was the almost incredible stupidity of the "dark forces" at the head of the Imperial Russian Government which won over practically everybody in the nation to revolution. The Court circle did everything to alienate the people—tried to hinder the work of the Union of Zemstvos and the Union of Towns, the only two organizations that were doing anything to make the soldier's lot tolerable, cut down on food supplies to the larger towns in order to provoke the kind of revolution it would be easy to crush, traded with the enemy, sold contracts, put in prison the political refugees which returned to Russia on the outbreak of the war in order to fight in the ranks, spread stories to the effect that all military defeats were due to the treachery of the Jews, etc. It is a long and dreary record of stupidity which Mr. Levine chronicles. The Government finally succeeded in alienating the peasants, the soldiers, the middle and upper classes, the Duma, the diplomats of its own allies. Even these blunders might not have been irremediable if it had not made the fatal mistake of uniting the soldiers and the people in a common cause against the autocracy. The government hadn't a friend left in the world except perhaps a few junkers in Potsdam. And when the revolution did come, the army which Protopopov expected to be his chief reliance proved to be his weakest reed. Mr. Levine tells the whole story briskly and with every seeming effort to be accurate and fair. The various personalities that emerged from the panorama of revolution are only briefly sketched. Mr. Levine does not pretend to ultimate judgments. Yet in two instances myths that had wide acceptance in America and the other Allied countries during the first two years of the war are destroyed—more by Mr. Levine's complete avoidance of any discussion of them than by any explicit denial of their truth. Those myths were the myth of the sentimental love of the people for the "little Father" and the myth of the power of the Church, which was supposed to be making the war into a crusade for the capture of the holy places, especially Constantinople. In Mr. Levine's opinion these things existed largely in the imagination of litterateurs. And that Mr. Levine's opinion has some claim to consideration can be proved not only by this admirable little book, but almost any day in the New York Tribune by his comments on the current episodes that are so rapidly changing the perspective and texture of the new Russia and, as we still hope in spite of recent discouragement from wholesale desertions, of the new world.

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to this issue

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